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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper is a draft chapter of a forthcoming book on the taxation of international
business profit by the authors of this paper, to be published by Oxford University Press.
The group has been meeting regularly for five years, to identify and discuss the key
problems of the existing international tax system, and to develop potential options for
reform. The book will study two proposals for reform in depth. One is the destination-
based cash flow tax – a draft chapter on this proposal has already been released.1 The
second proposal – for a form of residual profit allocation - is presented here.
This paper is largely self-standing and can be read without necessarily reading the rest
of the book, although it does refer in places to arguments set out in other draft chap-
ters. We hope to make these other chapters available shortly. We invite comments on
the contents of the two draft chapters which have been made available; they can be
made to the chair of the group, Michael Devereux,2 or to any of the group members.
We refer to the proposal set out in this paper as a Residual Profit Allocation by Income,
or RPA-I. It is one of a family of schemes based on separating the total profit of a mul-
tinational enterprise (MNE) into two parts – the “routine” profit and the “residual”
profit. This distinction is familiar from the existing system in the context of profit splits.
The proposal here goes considerably further than the existing system; nevertheless, it
is based on existing features and concepts. As such, although the RPA-I would involve
substantial departures from the existing system, we believe that the transition to it
could be achieved broadly within the context of the existing system.
The RPA-I allocates the right to tax routine profit to the country where functions and
activities take place. It allocates the right to tax residual profit to the market, or desti-
nation, country where sales are made to third parties.
We argue that the RPA-I has attractive properties – while it is far from perfect, it
matches well the criteria by which we aim to evaluate proposals for tax reform: eco-
nomic efficiency, fairness, robustness to avoidance, ease of implementation, and in-
centive compatibility. The RPA-I’s superior performance under these criteria relative
to the existing system stems primarily from allocating taxing rights for residual profit
1 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael J. Keen and John Vella (2017) “Destination-based cash
flow taxation”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 17/01.
2 By email at michael.devereux@sbs.ox.ac.uk
4to the destination country. The relative immobility of the third-party purchaser of
goods and services sold by the company – especially in the case of individuals, rather
than businesses – implies that the location of the taxation of residual profit is not easily
manipulated. This is true of manipulation by shifting real economic activity – which
creates economic distortions and hence inefficiencies – and also of the manipulation
of the location of taxable profit. Thus the introduction of the RPA-I would be likely to
result in a significant improvement in the performance of the existing system, both in
terms of economic efficiency and robustness to avoidance.
Yet the RPA-I is based firmly on concepts employed by the existing system. “Routine”
profit is the profit a third party would expect to earn for performing a particular set of
functions and activities on an outsourcing basis. In this outsourcing model the third-
party functions essentially as a service provider; it does not share in the overall risk of
the MNE, and earns no return based on the overall success or failure of the product or
business to which its activities relate. The routine profit for an affiliate would be based
on the rate of profit earned by a comparable third party, applied to an appropriate cost
base, although other transfer pricing approaches could also be used. In this sense, the
RPA-I would not discriminate between activities that are undertaken within the busi-
ness as opposed to outsourced to an independent business.
The residual profit of a MNE can be calculated in two ways. The first, bottom-up ap-
proach, identifies the residual gross income (RGI) earned in each destination country.
This is measured as the value of sales to third parties in that jurisdiction, less the costs
of goods sold, including expenses incurred in that country plus the transfer value of
goods and services purchased from other parts of the MNE. The transfer value is based
on the costs incurred in the relevant functions and activities of the selling party to-
gether with any routine profit associated with those costs. Costs that cannot be directly
allocated to specific sales would then be apportioned to each destination country
based on that country’s share of total RGI, and the apportioned costs would be de-
ducted to determine the residual profit in each destination country. This approach can
be structured to yield identical results to a top-down approach by which the total re-
sidual income – calculated simply as total profit less total routine profit - is apportioned
directly by RGI. The RPA-I would apply irrespective of the nature of the presence of the
MNE in the destination country. Residual profit is allocated to destination countries
whether there is a subsidiary, branch, or simply a remote sale there.
The RPA-I thus adheres to existing transfer pricing rules where they are generally
deemed to work reasonably well (to calculate routine profit) and departs from these
5rules in the context of residual profit, where these rules are generally deemed to strug-
gle.
This RPA-I proposal differs from other RPA options proposed in the literature in two
important ways. First, routine profit is determined by common transfer pricing tech-
niques, instead of being based on a fixed mark-up over costs. That makes it more able
to reflect the specific conditions faced by individual businesses and aims at neutrality
of treatment between activities undertaken within the business and those outsourced
to an independent business. Second, the apportionment of residual profit is based on
the location of RGI, rather than sales. This has advantages in terms of both economic
efficiency and robustness to avoidance.
Michael Graetz served as a member of the group until 2016. We would like to thank
him for his many contributions to our deliberations, especially on the RPA-I proposal
described here. Michael was not involved in the drafting of this Chapter.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be taken to repre-
sent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
6I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and analyses an alternative approach to the taxation of interna-
tional business profit that we believe has significant advantages compared to current
arrangements: the Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPA-I).
The RPA-I is one of a family of Residual Profit Allocation (RPA) schemes that divide in-
ternational business profit for tax purposes across countries in two steps.3 In a first
step, all business functions and activities within a multinational enterprise (MNE)—
R&D activities, manufacturing, general and administrative activities, sales and market-
ing activities and others—would be allocated a “routine profit” and taxed in the coun-
tries where these functions and activities are performed. In a second step, the remain-
ing “residual profit”—the MNE’s total profit less the sum of routine profits across all
countries—would be apportioned across countries according to some mechanical rule.
Options within this family of schemes vary most significantly in the manner in which
routine profit is calculated for the first step, and the choice of location and apportion-
ment rule for the second step. An important option, first proposed by Avi-Yonah,
Clausing and Durst,4 calculates routine profit through a fixed mark-up over costs and
apportions residual profit to the market, or destination, country entirely by sales.5 The
RPA-I proposed in this chapter calculates routine profit using existing transfer pricing
techniques. It also apportions residual profit to the destination country, though using
as an apportionment formula not sales but ‘residual gross income’ (RGI), defined as
sales to third parties less costs attributable to those sales.
The RPA-I’s appeal
The RPA-I offers important improvements over the current system, and, in some re-
spects, also over the Destination Based Cash Flow Tax (DBCFT) discussed in Chapter 7.6
It also offers improvements over other RPA proposals.
The RPA-I, and other recently-proposed RPA schemes, allocates taxing rights over re-
sidual profit to destination countries – that is, the country of a third-party purchaser of
3 See Andrus and Oosterhuis (2017) p.102 et seq. and Oosterhuis and Parsons (2017).
4 Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst (2009); see also Avi-Yonah (2010), Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011) and
Benshalom (2009).
5 Luckhaupt, Overesch and Schreiber (2012), p.107 et seq put forward a similar model.
6 See Auerbach, Devereux, Keen and Vella (2017).
7goods or services. It therefore partly harnesses the benefits of destination-based taxes
discussed in Chapter 5. Below we assess the RPA-I against the five criteria we use to
evaluate any system for taxing international business profit. However, by way of intro-
duction, we note two major advantages relative to the existing system: it would be less
susceptible to tax avoidance, and it would have a smaller distorting influence on real
economic decisions.
These advantages stem primarily from the relative immobility of the third-party pur-
chaser. This is particularly true when the purchaser is an individual consumer, but in
many cases is also true when the purchaser is an independent business. By apportion-
ing residual profits to the destination country, the place of taxation becomes both
more transparent and less mobile. The greater transparency arises because there is a
transaction with an independent third party, as opposed to between affiliates of the
same MNE; the value of the transaction is therefore observable, which greatly dimin-
ishes, though, as will be seen, does not wholly eliminate, the opportunity to shift re-
sidual profit to a tax-favoured jurisdiction. The relative immobility of the destination
country should also mean that the location of the activities of the MNE should be less
sensitive to differences in taxation between countries. For example, given the option
of producing in one jurisdiction and selling in another, and ignoring the costs of trans-
porting goods and services produced, a tax in the place of sale should not affect the
location of production.
As discussed below, the RPA-I should be less distortive and susceptible to tax avoidance
than other RPA schemes, including that proposed by Avi-Yonah et al, although this does
come at the price of greater complexity. The DBCFT does – in principle, at least – have
more attractive efficiency properties and goes further in eliminating profit-shifting op-
portunities and the scope for tax competition. But RPAs also have an important ad-
vantage over the DBCFT and other pure destination-based options such as a sales-
based formulary apportionment that vest taxing rights exclusively to the destination
country. That is because RPAs allocate some taxing rights to all countries involved in
the generation of an MNE’s profits. This reduces the advantage from locating the tax
in the destination country but gives RPAs a practical appeal since they accord more
readily with a common perception of fairness and depart less dramatically from current
arrangements in the allocation of taxing rights.
As a result, the basic structure of RPA schemes is more familiar to tax practitioners than
that of pure destination-based options. In fact, the distinction between routine and
residual profit, which is at the heart of RPAs, is the basis for most profit splits under
8existing transfer pricing rules. RPAs can thus be viewed as a significant expansion and
modification of an existing transfer pricing mechanism.
The RPA-I in particular would require a less dramatic departure from the existing sys-
tem than other RPA schemes, since it uses familiar transfer pricing methods to calcu-
late routine profits. Moreover, as explained below, the implied apportionment of re-
sidual profits can also be achieved by using transfer pricing methods and concepts fa-
miliar to practitioners. The RPA-I scheme thus achieves fundamental reform, address-
ing many of the problems left outstanding by the BEPS project, but does so in a way
that is readily comprehensible to today’s tax practitioners.
More on the RPA-I
The RPA-I has the appeal of a hybrid: it uses familiar transfer pricing methods to
achieve what they are generally thought to (or could) do relatively simply and effec-
tively (calculate routine profits), and it reaps the benefits of a unitary approach where
they do not (in allocating the residual profit). Even in the latter case, however, it partly
uses well-known transfer pricing methods and concepts. This requires some further
explanation.
Under the RPA-I routine profit is determined using well-established transfer pricing
methods. The right to tax this routine profit is given to the country in which the MNE’s
functions and activities take place. The concept of routine profits is familiar to transfer
pricing specialists.7 It is the profit a third party would expect to earn for performing a
particular set of functional activities on an outsourcing basis, in which the third party
is essentially a service provider that does not share in the overall risk of the business.
Typically, routine profit for functions and activities in a particular jurisdiction can be
calculated as a mark-up over (certain) expenses incurred,8 where the mark-up is based
on the rate of profit earned in a comparable service provider, although other transfer
pricing techniques could also be used. But the key to the use of these methods in this
context is that they aim to identify only the routine element of profit, and not to include
any residual profit.
7 See OECD (2017) Annex II to Chapter II, p.433.
8 In principle a mark-up should not be given for expenses incurred in purchasing intermediate goods, as
this would result in double counting. This is discussed in more detail below.
9The right to tax the remaining residual profit is given to the countries in which sales to
independent third parties are made: the destination countries. The calculation of how
residual profit is allocated between destination countries can be undertaken in two
ways, which generate exactly the same results.
The first approach (which we label “bottom-up”) draws more closely on existing tech-
niques and is in two steps.
At the first step, the RGI in each destination country is calculated. As noted, this
is equal to the sales revenues in that country less “allocable” expenses (by
which is meant expenses incurred in any country that can be directly allocated
to the goods or services sold in the relevant destination country) and the rou-
tine profit associated with those expenses. Allocable third-party expenses in-
curred in the destination country, together with an associated routine profit
where relevant, are simply deducted from sales revenues. Allocable expenses
incurred by other affiliates are allocated to destination countries by construct-
ing deemed transfer prices equal to the expenses and associated routine profits
of the other affiliates.
At the second step, residual profit in each destination country is determined as
RGI less a share of the MNE’s total “non-allocable” expenses (by which is meant
those expenses that cannot be directly allocated to any specific sales, for exam-
ple, research and development expenses, general and administrative expenses
and global sales and marketing expenses) and the routine profit associated with
those expenses. Each destination country is allocated a share of the non-allo-
cable expenses based on its share of the MNE’s total RGI.
The second, and equivalent, approach to allocation of residual profit amongst destina-
tion countries (which we label “top-down”) is to first calculate the MNE’s total residual
profit, as its total profit less its total routine profit. This total residual profit can then
be allocated amongst destination countries in proportion to their RGI. This yields iden-
tical results to the first approach.9
The “bottom-up” approach to the RPA-I is likely to appeal most naturally to practition-
ers steeped in the use of transfer prices to allocate profits. The “top-down” approach
may appeal more to economists and others familiar with the concept of formulary
9 This is shown in the Appendix.
10
apportionment. But it is important to emphasise that the two approaches can be struc-
tured to yield the same outcome.
Countries then tax, potentially at different rates, the routine profit and the residual
profit located in that country.
We should note, at the outset, the changed role of Permanent Establishment (PE) rules
- one of the cornerstones of the existing system - under the RPA-I. Existing PE rules
retain a role for the purposes of determining routine profit. A MNE’s functions and
activities in a particular country are allocated a routine profit only if existing PE thresh-
olds are met. The RPA-I aims to be neutral in its treatment of subsidiaries and PEs. For
this reason, once the PE threshold is met, the profit allocated to the PE ought to be the
same as the profit that would be allocated to a local subsidiary. This suggests using
transfer-pricing rules as set out above also in the context of PEs.10 PE profit attribution
rules11 could also be used for these purposes, but the goal, again, would be that of
attributing only a routine profit to the functions and activities undertaken by the PE.
The RPA-I abandons existing PE rules for residual profit purposes. Destination countries
are allocated a residual profit once revenues from third party sales meet a set thresh-
old level of sales. Under the RPA-I, therefore, it is immaterial whether a MNE sells its
goods or services to consumers in a particular country through a subsidiary, a branch,
or remotely without having any physical presence there. Residual profits are calculated
in the same way in each of these settings, meaning that the RPA-I does not distort
behaviour along this margin.
An example may help to illustrate important similarities and differences of the RPA-I
with the existing system. Under traditional transfer pricing rules many MNEs are able
to centralise their risks, and to some extent their global or regional functions and ac-
tivities, in an entity, often described as the entrepreneur affiliate, resident in a tax-
favoured country.12 Imagine then a manufacturer and seller of products that finances
10 Using transfer pricing rules (Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention) to attribute profit to a PE
constitutes a departure from the existing system, as profit attribution rules (Article 7 of the OCED Model
Tax Convention) are currently used for these purposes. However, the latter have moved closer to the
former under the Authorised OECD Approach (AOA) introduced in 2010. Admittedly, the take up of such
rules has been somewhat limited.
11 When a company resident in one country operates in a second country through a PE, rules are re-
quired to determine how much profit is attributable to the PE and therefore taxable by the second coun-
try.
12 OECD (2017b) Chapter IX: Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings.
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its R&D internally from an entrepreneur affiliate in a tax-favoured country. It also ei-
ther manufactures its products in a low cost or tax-favoured country or engages third
party contract manufacturers that provide manufacturing services. Finally it sells its
products to limited-risk distribution affiliates around the world, who then sell to local
affiliates, who sell to third parties. Its R&D activities are funded under a cost-sharing
basis, or on a cost-plus basis, under a research contract so that the R&D-performing
affiliate is deemed to earn no more than a cost-plus “routine” return. Any third-party
contract manufacturers that provide manufacturing services also receive a cost-plus,
routine return on investment; alternatively, an internal transfer price would be ar-
ranged so that the manufacturing affiliate would also earn a cost-plus routine return.
Finally, the limited risk distributor affiliates again earns a cost-plus routine return. In
this case, the entrepreneur affiliate earns the entire residual profit (and suffers any
loss) reflecting its role as the deemed “risk taker” (in addition to whatever functions
and activities it performs) within the MNE.
The BEPS Action Plan fully recognised the tax planning opportunities presented by cur-
rent tax arrangements, and tried to address them by a new approach to risk allocation
within corporate groups. This looks into the financial capacity of an affiliate to assume
risk as well as the personal capacity of its directors and employees to control and mon-
itor risk.13 This approach is unconvincing, partly because it still allows profit shifting,
albeit at the higher cost involved in moving some real activity, but also because, fol-
lowing the OECD’s own guiding principle for the existing system (i.e. aligning profit with
value creation), the mere increase in personnel controlling and monitoring risk in a
jurisdiction is not logically linked to the generation of a profit in that jurisdiction.14
The RPA-I system mimics the outcome just described, in which most affiliates of the
MNE are deemed to earn only a routine return for tax purposes—except, crucially, that
the residual profit would no longer be allocated to an entrepreneurial affiliate in a tax-
favoured jurisdiction. Instead, it would be allocated to destination countries. This is the
key shift that drives the strengths and appeal of the RPA-I.
13 OECD (2017b) Chapter I.D.1.2.1 para 1.56 et seq.; for business restructurings see Chapter IX.D.2 para
9.43 et seq.; for an analysis of this new approach see Bilaney (2016); Verlinden, Ledure and Dessy (2016).
14 Andrus and Oosterhuis (2017) p.89 et seq.; Schön (2014) p.280 et seq.
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Chapter structure
This chapter is structured as follows. Section II provides context to the RPA-I proposal
by briefly describing the current movement of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
towards transactional “profit splits”. Section III describes the RPA-I in more detail; it
sets out, at some length, each aspect of the calculations it requires and the rationale
underlying them. Section IV briefly compares the RPA-I with a limited number of alter-
native RPA proposals. Section V evaluates the RPA-I proposal against the criteria set
out in Chapter 2. Section VI discusses issues of implementation.
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II. THE GRADUAL MOVE TOWARDS PROFIT SPLITS
The distinction between routine and residual profits, which is at the heart of RPA ap-
proaches, is familiar to practitioners because a similar distinction is made under an
existing – OECD approved – transfer pricing method: profit splits. Moving from the ex-
isting system to an RPA would be a very significant change for the reasons discussed
below. However, this similarity makes the move evolutionary rather than a complete
rupture. Indeed, in some respects, it would be a further step in the direction of travel
the international tax system has been on for some time.
Profit Splits under OECD Guidelines
Since the publication of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995, there has been
a constant drift towards profit splits and other formulary methods in the allocation of
the profit associated with particular transactions (or related sets of transactions)
among affiliates of a MNE.15 This development reflects practical difficulties that are
rooted in underlying conceptual difficulties with the arm’s length principle, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 above.
At a practical level it has been acknowledged that traditional transfer pricing methods
– looking for comparable uncontrolled prices or applying a cost-plus test as well as a
resale-minus test – increasingly fail to deliver satisfying results.16 This outcome is inev-
itable given the increasing tendency of businesses towards tailor-made production
chains, close economic integration and the decisive relevance of proprietary intangi-
bles.
These practical difficulties are predicted by theory, given that it is the combination of
different production factors (involving input from all parts of the integrated business)
that justifies the very existence of firms; and that in the case of MNEs, these factors
can be spread across the world. More precisely, the hierarchical organisation of a
15 See Vann (2003), S.152 et seq. and Wittendorff (2016). For recent materials see OECD (2014a); OECD
(2014b); and OECD (2017a). For a historical analysis of the secular movement towards profit splits see
Li (2002) p.857 et seq.
16 Avi-Yonah (1995); Rosenbloom (2005); Couzin (2013),
(continued)
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worldwide value chain generates profits that go beyond the sum of the profits that
would be derived by the individual group entities in an open-market situation.17 These
synergies (and the economic rents generated by them) are not only hard to capture in
practice – they are not even allocable to specific corporate units or geographical loca-
tions in theory.18
Moreover, this fundamental practical and theoretical indeterminacy at the heart of
traditional transfer pricing brings about options for profit shifting between members
of the corporate group. Given the mobility of proprietary intangibles and the difficulty
faced in valuing them, intra-group transactions involving intangibles have been at the
very centre of the profit shifting activities targeted in the BEPS project.
Against this background, in 2018 the OECD put forward the “Revised Guidance on the
Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method”19 (OECD Revised Guidance) which
is the latest in a series of moves towards formulary methods. This emphasises the ne-
cessity of introducing further formulary elements into transfer pricing – although with-
out changing the international consensus on the value of the arm’s length standard as
a guiding principle, and applied not to the unitary profits of a MNE but to specific trans-
actions (or related sets of transactions).
This results in a two-step approach. In a first step, traditional transfer pricing methods
are applied as far as possible. This means that for “routine functions” within a MNE,
the pricing of intra-group dealings will be built on “comparable uncontrolled prices”,
the “cost-plus” method or the “resale-minus” method.20 Taking into account the activ-
ities of an affiliate – the functions it performs, the assets it uses and the risks it assumes
– this would most probably result in a “routine profit” that can be allocated to that
17 Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011) p.378 et seq.; Elkins (2017) p.158 et seq.; Li (2002) p.832 et seq.;
Schön (2011) p.231 et seq.; Luckhaupt et al. (2012) p.100 et seq.; Vann (2003) p.139 et seq.; Vann
(2010) p.321 et seq..
18 Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013); Kane (2014).
19 OECD (2018); this revised guidance replaces Section C, Part III, Chapter II of the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations.
20 OECD (2018) para 2.127, 2.152; in a similar vein Avi-Yonah (2010) p.16 et seq.
(continued)
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entity. But it is also clear that this “routine profit” cannot logically include the profits
derived from the synergies generated by the firm as a whole.
In a second step, those functions within the MNE come to the fore, which – due to their
highly integrated nature21 or due to the influence of unique and valuable intangibles
as key sources of profit22 - are not amenable to traditional transfer pricing examination.
The same is true of entities within a MNE which contractually share in the overall busi-
ness risk of the firm.23 For these functions (and the group entities performing these
functions) the OECD Revised Guidance proposes a limited profit split.
This approach does not involve a pre-ordained allocation rule as under statutory for-
mulary apportionment, but instead looks at the integrated business on a case-by-case
basis. The main basis for the allocation of the residual is the relative value of the “con-
tributions performed by the separate affiliates within the firm – either asset-based or
cost-based.”24 This reflects the underlying assumption that all locations where the firm
is present contribute to the residual profit and thus justify taxation.25 The slicing of the
cake will involve a close examination of the nature of the relevant business functions,
the level of expenditure incurred by the participating entities and – to a more limited
extent post-BEPS – the contractual arrangements between the involved affiliates. This
exercise is meant to fully allocate the firm’s profit to the involved entities insofar as it
exceeds the “routine profits” assigned to the entities in the first step.
The OECD approach appears to create a fundamental de facto distinction within the
corporate group between limited risk affiliates (which are assigned a routine profit)
and entrepreneurial affiliates (which participate in the residual profit of the overall en-
terprise). For the entrepreneurial affiliates this method will result in most cases in a
higher return on investment (given the existence of synergy rents within the firm) but
21 OECD (2018) para 2.120., 2133 et seq.
22 OECD (2018) para 2.119, 2.130.
23 OECD (2018) para 2.121, 2.139 – 2.142.
24 OECD (2018) para 2.114, 2.150 et seq., 2.169 et seq., 2.179 et seq.; for a similar proposal see Schön
(2011) p.246 et seq.
25 For a theoretical argument for this kind of profit split see Vann (2010) p.321 et seq.
(continued)
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also in a higher volatility of net results (given the necessity to allocate residual losses
in the same fashion as residual profits).26
According to the OECD, the division between limited risk and entrepreneurial entities
will be derived by testing whether an affiliate’s functions as well as its contractual re-
lations with other group members are amenable to traditional transfer pricing analysis,
e.g. whether information on comparable uncontrolled transactions is available.27 The
more integrated a firm is and the more hard-to-value its intangibles are, the less it
seems possible to resort to those traditional methods.
OECD Profit Splits and RPA Schemes: Similarity and Differences
The distinction between routine and residual profits is at the heart of both profit splits
and RPA schemes. But there are also significant differences between the two, and es-
pecially between the OECD approach and more formulary approaches, such as the RPA
proposed by Avi-Yonah et al. We briefly identify these as a means of introducing some
of the choices made in developing the RPA-I.
First, the basic approach of RPA schemes is to calculate “residual profit” at the level of
the MNE as a whole, or within the MNE on a product line basis. By contrast, profit splits
aim to allocate profit in more limited circumstances, between a limited number of af-
filiates within an MNE. The RPA-I is aligned more closely with RPA schemes, in that it
takes a systematic approach to allocating residual profit for the whole MNE. However,
it does leave open the possibility of allocating residual profit on a “product-by-product” basis,
within a MNE.
Second, RPA schemes apply to all MNEs (defined broadly), while profit splits are ap-
plied only to MNEs with certain characteristics, such as high-integration and presence
of hard-to-value intangibles, and even then they apply differentially among affiliates of
such MNEs. In the latter case, the OECD Revised Guidance distinguishes between enti-
ties that are assigned routine profits and entities that are assigned the residual profit.28
The OECD’s approach has the weakness that the level of a subsidiary’s integration
26 OECD (2018) para 2.115.
27 OECD (2018) para 2.143.
28 For a critical view see Robillard (2015) p.448 et seq.
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within the overall value chain of a MNE is not a binary matter; rather, it is an incremen-
tal matter subject to a sliding scale. There is no “discontinuity” in the level of integra-
tion on which a sharp contrast in tax treatment can be built. In particular as far as syn-
ergy rents are concerned, these rents derive from the overall set-up of the MNE and
not only from the interaction within a subset of affiliates.
Third, unlike the OECD approach, RPA schemes may not apply the full transfer pricing
methodology to identify the routine return. For example, the RPA proposed by Avi-
Yonah et al sets a fixed return on expenditure incurred by the entity in question irre-
spective of the functions performed and the risks assumed.29 This distinction intro-
duces an important trade-off. A fixed return offers simplicity over the OECD approach.
However, among other things, this may drive a wedge between in-sourcing and out-
sourcing and therefore makes taxation more relevant to the boundaries of the firm. By
using the full complement of transfer pricing methodology, the OECD approach – and,
in relation to routine profit, the RPA-I approach set out here - seek to approximate the
tax treatment of dependent and independent firms, which is the basic rationale for the
arm’s length principle.
The benefit of doing so becomes clear when comparing an MNE’s choice whether to
allocate manufacturing functions to a subsidiary or to an independent contractor. In
principle, this choice should not be distorted by the application of a transfer pricing
approach allocating only “routine profits” to individual entities to the extent that these
closely approximate the profits an outside contractor would earn. To the extent that
only routine profits are allocated to the manufacturing subsidiary, the tax burden on
the remaining part of the MNE would remain largely unchanged irrespective of the
outcome. It would not even be necessary to establish an overall concept of which en-
tities belong to the “group” as such (an important point as regards the treatment of
joint ventures or subsidiaries with minority shareholders). The “make or buy” decision
which lies at the heart of the overall business model of the firm would be subject only
to genuine business considerations.30
29 Avi-Yonah et al (2009); Luckhaupt et al (2012) p.110, 114.
30 The distortions created by formulary allocation of profits within a firm as opposed to the allocation of
profits to independent contractors is highlighted by Hines (2010).
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Fourth, while the OECD approach allocates taxing rights over residual profits on an as-
set or activity basis – albeit in a rather unprescriptive manner - the RPA-I and other RPA
schemes allocate taxing rights over these profits to destination countries. As discussed
in general terms in Chapter 5 above, and more specifically below, allocating the resid-
ual profit to destination countries brings benefits in terms of improved economic effi-
ciency, less profit shifting and improved incentive compatibility.
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III. THE RPA-I IN OUTLINE
1. An Example and Some Terminology
In order to explain the proposal as clearly as possible, we will make use of an on-going
example. We set out this example first in Table 1, and then describe how the tax would
be applied.
Table 1. Basic Example: Third Party Expenses and Revenues
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Sales
Quantity sold 96 24 80 200
Price per unit 10 10 15
Revenues 960 240 1200 2400
Expenses
Allocable expenses incurred by each affiliate
Purchase of intermediate goods 200 200
Other cost of goods sold 340 340
Sales & Marketing: Local 200 40 180 420
Total allocable expenses 200 580 180 960
Non-allocable expenses incurred by each af-
filiate
Sales & Marketing: Global 200 200
General and Administrative (G&A) 100 100
Research and Development (R&D) 300 300
Total non-allocable expenses 600 0 0 600
Total Costs 800 580 180 1560
Global Profit 840
We consider an MNE with three affiliates located in different countries, A, B and C.
Each affiliate sells a single finished good to local consumers. In total, 96 units are sold
in A, 24 units are sold in B and 80 units are sold in C. To allow for variation across
countries, we assume that the product specification sold in C is of higher quality than
that sold in the other two countries. As a result, it sells for a higher price: 15 in C, and
10 in A and B. The cost of goods sold (manufacturing costs in this example) is also higher
for the specification sold in C. The finished goods are produced by the affiliate in B. B
purchases one unit of an intermediate good at a price of 1 for each of the 200 units of
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the finished good produced, at a total cost of 200. In addition, it has costs of 2per unit
for the specification sold in C, and 1.5 per unit for the specification sold in A and B, for
an additional total cost of 340. The total manufacturing cost incurred in B is therefore
540.
In addition to the costs of manufacturing, which are incurred in country B, the MNE
has other costs: local sales and marketing costs are incurred where goods are sold; and
costs of global sales and marketing, general and administrative (G&A) and research and
development (R&D) expenses, all of which are incurred in country A. We briefly define
these terms in Box 1.
All of these costs are assumed to relate to purchases from third parties – they do not
include any purchases from other affiliates. Overall, the group has sales of 2,400 and
costs of 1,560, implying a total profit of 840.
We now describe in more detail the calculation for this example of routine and residual
profit under the RPA-I, and how each is allocated to each country.
Box 1. Some definitions of costs
Allocable costs: Costs that can be allocated directly to specific sales of goods and ser-
vices. The costs may be incurred in any country but – for the purpose of identifying
residual profit in each country – they are “allocated” to the country in which the sale
to an independent purchaser is made. In our example, these costs include the cost of
goods sold and local expenses for sales and marketing.
Non-allocable costs: Costs that cannot be allocated directly to specific sales of goods
and services. In our example, these include G&A, R&D, and global sales and marketing
costs.
Cost of goods sold: Direct costs attributable to the production of the goods or services
sold. These costs may include the purchase of raw materials and other intermediate
goods, labour costs, and the costs of storage, shipping and depreciation.
General and Administrative (G&A) costs: Operational costs that cannot be directly re-
lated to the production of any specific goods or services, including items such as rent,
utilities, insurance and managerial salaries.
Sales and marketing costs: Costs related to selling, promoting and delivering a prod-
uct; these are not included in the costs of goods sold. Such costs can be incurred in and
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for a specific market (which we label a local expense, and which are an allocable cost),
or they could be general expenses not for a specific market (which we label a global
expense, and a non-allocable cost).
2. Routine Profits
What are routine profits?
As set out above, the concept of routine profits is familiar to transfer pricing special-
ists.31 It can be defined as the profit a third party would expect to earn for performing
a particular set of functions or activities essentially on an outsourcing basis. In this
“outsourcing model” the third party does not share in the overall risk of the MNE, and
earns no return based on the overall success or failure of the product or business to
which its activities relate. It functions essentially as a service provider. By employing
this concept of routine profit for an affiliate undertaking a similar activity, the tax sys-
tem would not generally discriminate between activities that are undertaken within
the business as opposed to outsourced to an independent business. 32
Such third-party outsourcing businesses exist for most functions and activities of mul-
tinational groups, in the form of contract manufacturers, researchers, logistic providers
and marketers. Their returns reflect the value of any expertise in performing their ac-
tivities and functions plus their capital investments. The returns also reflect their own
risk – including the risk inherent in attracting sufficient customers to maintain a profit-
able business. But these risks do not include the underlying risks of the businesses that
use their services.33
31 OECD (2017) Annex II to Chapter II, p.433.
32 Note that the notion of a routine return is not inherently linked to that of a ‘routine activity’ often
encountered in discussions of transfer pricing. The RPA-I does not require distinguishing between rou-
tine and non-routine activities.
33 It is possible that the risks of the service provider may, in general, depend on the risks associated with
the general market conditions for the final goods and services to which its inputs contribute, though in
principle not on the unique risks of the specific MNE to which it sells its intermediate goods or services.
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The concepts of routine and residual profit profits are broadly related to – but are not
equivalent to - the economic concepts of “normal” returns and “excess” returns or
“economic rents” which were introduced in Chapter 2. Box 2, below, discusses the sim-
ilarities and differences between routine profits and normal returns, and between re-
sidual profits and economic rents.
Box 2.
Is residual profit equivalent to economic rent?
Routine profit is the profit that an independent contractor would be expected to earn,
given that it does not share the overall risk of the business. Residual profit is profit
earned by the business in excess of this routine profit. It is tempting to equate this
distinction between the routine profit and residual profit to the economic distinction
between the normal return on an investment and economic rent, even though they
would be calculated differently. However, while there is some overlap between the
two distinctions, they should not be thought of as equivalent.
Routine profit is defined as the return for the functions and activities undertaken by
the business in a particular period, taking into account only the risks that would be
faced by an independent contractor – which do not include the general risks faced by
a MNE employing the independent contractor. Similarly, the normal return for the in-
dependent contractor is defined in terms of the required expected rate of return on
the amount invested in the business, again taking into account only those risks faced
by the independent contractor. In theory, this required expected rate of return should
be the same as the required expected rate of return for a large MNE to undertake the
same activity. (This would be true in standard asset pricing models, for example the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), in which the required return depends on the cor-
relation of the returns of the investment project with the whole of the market).
However, almost by definition, neither the routine profit nor the normal return on cap-
ital include compensation for the whole risk of the MNE. Consider, for example, a phar-
maceutical company that requires research into a potential new medicine. It could sub-
contract that work to an independent contractor, who is paid irrespective of the out-
come of the research. Or it could undertake the research itself directly. The routine
return for the latter approach could be evaluated by comparison with such an inde-
pendent contractor. But it is clear that this does not represent the entire risk borne by
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the MNE, which will depend also on whether or not the research is successful. The MNE
would require a higher expected rate of return to compensate it for the higher risk;
this higher expected rate of return would not be included in the routine profit and so
would instead be included in the residual profit. However, it does not represent eco-
nomic rent, which is defined as a return over and above that required to compensate
for all risk.
In principle, the routine profit should reflect only the required return of the independ-
ent contractor – a level of profit required to keep the contractor in business. However,
in practice there may be many reasons why the outturn rate of return of a contractor
differs from this required expected rate of return, i.e., the contractor's normal rate of
return. In particular, higher rates of return may incorporate an element of economic
rent, to the extent that the contractor has some market power. In this case a MNE
using the contractor as a comparable for the purposes of identifying its routine profit
may include an element of economic rent. While an adjustment could in principle be
made to remove any component of economic rent, this would be difficult in practice.
In sum, therefore, it is possible that the residual profit may be greater than, or smaller
than, economic rent of the overall enterprise.
Where are routine profits deemed to arise?
Routine profits are deemed to arise in the country where functions and activities take
place. This is also the case if inputs are purchased from or in a different country. In our
example, the MNE undertakes R&D activities in Country A. Routine profit in A can be
calculated as a mark-up on its relevant costs, –subject to the availability of data from
comparable businesses. This would be true even if part of the costs were originally
purchased by the MNE through a central purchasing office in Country D.34 If the MNE
has a subsidiary in A, then that subsidiary must buy the relevant inputs from the pur-
chasing centre in D, and the routine profit in A would reflect a mark-up on those costs.
If the MNE has a PE in A, then A would be allocated the same routine profit, as a mark-
up on the relevant costs incurred by the central purchasing office.
34 In this case routine profit would arise in Country D for the purchasing function performed there.
24
Measuring routine profits under the RPA-I
In the RPA-I system, routine profits are measured following existing transfer pricing
practice that relies on public third party comparable outsourcing company data. The
primary approach we discuss in this chapter is the cost-plus approach, which requires
there to be a comparable business with a relevant rate of mark-up on its costs that can
be used to apply to the costs of the MNE.
As a starting point, mark-ups should not be given for costs incurred in purchasing in-
termediate goods, whether from independent suppliers or related parties, as this
would result in double counting.35 As we set out below, in our example the affiliate in
C purchases goods manufactured in B at a cost of 256 (240 of manufacturing costs and
16 of routine profit). If the affiliate in C were allocated a routine profit based on a mark-
up of, say, 10% on this expenditure, then it would have additional routine profit of 25.6.
This would double-count the routine profit associated with the functions and activities
undertaken by the affiliate in B. This would lead to routine profit being overstated and
consequently residual profit understated, which, in turn, could have efficiency conse-
quences or could be used for tax avoidance purposes.
Excluding intermediate goods, leaves labour costs and the depreciation cost of capital
goods as constituting most of the base for mark-ups for routine profit purposes. But
the process of calculating a routine profit is not a precise science; it is driven by the
financial data available for third party comparable businesses operating on an out-
sourcing basis. If these data reveal a profit margin relative to a set of expenses that
cannot be separated out, the profit margin of this business should be applied – with
necessary adjustments – to the same set of expenses of the company being attributed
a routine profit. The double counting problem can thus be addressed – to some extent
- through carefully matching the cost bases of the business receiving the mark-up and
35 By intermediate goods we mean goods incorporated in other products typically either by transfor-
mation (e.g., chemical processing) or assembly (e.g. installing semiconductors in a circuit board). This is
a narrower definition than that often used by public finance economists which includes any good or
service purchased by one business from another. As a matter of principle, under the RPA-I mark ups
would not be given on the purchase of intermediate goods defined in these broader terms, i.e. any
purchase of a good or service from any taxable entity, as this would avoid the problem of double count-
ing altogether. But we use the narrower definition of intermediate goods in this chapter to remain as
close as possible to the existing system.
25
the comparable business, and selecting an appropriate mark-up. However, this exer-
cise is likely to be somewhat rough and approximate thus possibly allowing some level
of double counting.
Other transfer pricing approaches can also be used. However, whatever approach is
used, its aim should be that of identifying only routine profits. This is important in en-
suring that the RPA-I complies more closely with the criteria for evaluating taxes. For
example, using a transfer pricing approach to identify only routine profits limits both
the incentive and opportunity to shift profits to a low-tax country. It also diminishes
the distortions to real location choices of the MNE. We discuss these issues further
below.
There are many problems with the current transfer pricing system. But whilst it is
clearly inadequate in dealing with certain transactions, such as payment for the use of
intangibles, we believe it is reasonably uncontentious in dealing with functions and
activities where the only risk taken into account is the overall level of business activity
of an independent subcontractor. We propose using current transfer pricing practices
to determine routine profits because they tend to work reasonably well in this con-
text.36
In many cases, data exist on relevant aspects of businesses that may be considered
comparable. For example, whether the activity is services (e.g. performing R&D37 or
marketing services38) or manufacturing,39 data from independent public companies in
such businesses are typically available in the United States that illustrate the cost struc-
ture and range of profitability that can be expected from such activities. In the
36 It is true that finding comparables within specific geographic areas, particularly in developing coun-
tries, can be a challenge given limitations on the number of public companies operating principally in
those jurisdictions. In such cases data on companies operating in broader markets may be the best that
can be found. But even in these cases useful benchmarks of profitability can be determined consistent
with the current application of the arms-length standard. In June 2017, the Platform for Collaboration
on Tax (2017) issued “A Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer
Pricing Analyses” which is particularly aimed at assisting the tax authorities of developing countries.
37 Independent research organisations (including, for example, software development contractors, and
drug clinical testing organizations) exist around the world and provide useful data on the returns earned
by those activities in the marketplace independent of the financial risks of product development.
38 Independent marketing companies (including for example, major advertising or market strategy com-
panies) and logistics companies provide useful data on the returns attributable to marketing and distri-
bution activities separate from the risks of developing and marketing a particular product.
39 Independent manufacturers (so-called “contract manufacturers”) provide relatively robust data on
the returns earned for manufacturing activities where the manufacturer is not funding the development
or marketing of the product being manufactured.
(continued)
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European Union, even closely-held companies are obliged to disclose their annual ac-
counts and profit statements to the general public.40
A large number of these types of companies are public and, thus, their financial state-
ments can be accessed through various commercial databases. These financial state-
ments can be utilised to estimate “routine” returns or profit allocations to multina-
tional functions and activities. As a general matter for service activities an appropriate
allocation can result from looking at the ratios of operating profit to total operating
costs of the comparable companies.41 For manufacturing the analysis can be similar
except that often adjustments may be appropriate for differentials in capital invest-
ment, in which case the rate of return on capital for the comparables can be employed
as an adjustment.
While we label these profits “routine” they can in fact be quite significant and are not
only related to “routine” functions in the sense of standardised functions performed
on a low-cost or a low-technology basis. The key is that the profit to be allocated is
based on what a third party would earn where that third party’s compensation is not
dependent on the success of the specific products sold or services provided by the
MNE.
As noted above, unlike the OECD approach, the RPA-I does not draw a line between
subsidiaries that receive a routine profit and those that receive a residual profit. Ra-
ther, all functions performed within the group by affiliated entities are attributed a
“routine profit” based on comparable functions performed by outside contractors. This
applies to all functions and activities, whether they involve allocable costs or non-allo-
cable costs.
Whatever the specific mechanism for applying the available comparable data to esti-
mate a routine return, the transfer pricing disputes that arise in these situations under
the existing system are as a general matter relatively manageable. A goal of the pro-
posal would be to limit future transfer pricing disputes to these types of matters.
40 Art.14 lit.f Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017
relating to certain aspects of company law (2017) is critical as to this wide-reaching approach to disclo-
sure; Schön (2006).
41 Or, stated another way, the ratio of operating profits to revenues, since revenues minus operating
costs equal operating profit.
(continued)
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If over time these transfer pricing disputes proved in fact to be troublesome or costly,
the determination of routine profits could be made more formulary, for example, by
implementing safe harbours or even mandatory mark-ups on specified costs42 or rates
of return on investment to determine routine returns without reference to specific
comparables. This would bring the RPA-I system closer to the RPA proposed by Avi
Yonah et al, although differences would remain on other aspects of the system. Such a
move could be attractive for developing countries which have in the past promoted
equivalent “safe harbour” rules which allocate a fixed return on business functions per-
formed on their territories.43 Note also that in recent years, the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines have started to accept, somewhat reluctantly, the value of those safe har-
bours which “involve a trade-off between strict compliance with the arm’s length prin-
ciple and administrability”.44
But – at least as an initial step - there would seem to be no need to move away from
traditional arm’s length pricing in determining routine profit as this would risk driving
an unwarranted wedge between insourcing and outsourcing of business functions.
And, in terms of familiarity to practitioners, there is some merit in not doing so.
Returning to our example, Table 2 shows routine profit for the business described in
Table 1. Recall that in our example routine profit is set through the cost-plus method.
We assume that there are two different rates of mark-up. Manufacturing – reflected
in the cost of goods sold – and research and development are assumed to have a 10%
mark-up, while other costs are assumed to have a 5% mark-up. These rates are set
arbitrarily to illustrate the case in which rates of mark-up differ between different types
of costs.
The mark-up on costs for the manufacturing affiliate in B applies only to costs excluding
the expenditure on intermediate goods. It applies a mark-up of 10% to the remaining
costs of 340, resulting in a routine profit of 34. The affiliate in A has a high routine profit
of 55, reflecting the fact that it undertakes all of the non-allocable expenditures, in-
cluding R&D which also has a mark-up of 10%. The affiliate in C has low routine profit
of only 9, since it only undertakes local sales and marketing expenses.
42 For example, mandatory mark-ups could be imposed only on labour costs thus avoiding the double
counting problem altogether.
43 Schoueri (2015) p.705 et seq.
44 OECD (2017) Chapter E, para 4.112.
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Table 2. Routine Profit
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
rate of
mark-up
(%)A B C
Other cost of goods sold (excluding
intermediate goods) 34 34 10
Sales & Marketing: Local 10 2 9 21 5
Sales & Marketing: Global 10 10 5
G&A 5 5 5
R&D 30 30 10
Routine profit 55 36 9 100
Note also that no routine profit is allocated to the affiliates in A and C for the costs
incurred in purchasing goods from B. For these affiliates the purchase of the finished
goods from B represents the purchase of intermediate goods, which the affiliates sell
on to third parties. Note also that no routine profit is allocated to the affiliates in B and
C for the costs incurred in A for the Global Sales & Marketing, G&A and R&D activities.
3. Residual Profit
Residual profit is profit earned by the business in excess of routine profit. As outlined
in the Introduction there are broadly two ways in which the residual profit can be cal-
culated under the RPA-I: a bottom-up and a top-down approach. The two are equiva-
lent. We begin with the bottom-up approach.45
3.1 A bottom-up approach
Under a bottom-up approach, there are two basic steps.
a. The first is to calculate the residual gross income (RGI) in each market country. This
starts with the revenues from specific goods or services sold to third-party custom-
ers, individuals or businesses located in each country, perhaps determined
45 For those who prefer algebra to examples, Appendix A formalizes the discussion that follows, and
provides a proof of the general equivalence between these two approaches.
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separately on a product-by-product or product line basis.46 The affiliate in the mar-
ket country47 then deducts all allocable costs which have been incurred in the pro-
vision of those goods and services. For purchases from third parties, these are
based on the actual price paid. For purchases from related parties, these are based
on a deemed transfer price, which is equal to the relevant costs and any associated
routine profit of of the affiliate selling to the affiliate in the market country. The
marketing affiliate also deducts a routine profit associated with its own direct costs,
such as its sale and marketing activities. Deducting allocable costs and any related
routine profits from revenues in each market country yields the RGI in that country.
b. The affiliate in the market country also deducts a share of the MNE’s total non-
allocable costs and related routine profit. The share is equal to its share of the
worldwide RGI of the MNE.
The hybrid nature of the RPA-I can be seen clearly in these two steps. Existing transfer
pricing techniques are used for costs that can be attributed to a particular product
(step a), and an apportionment system is used for costs that cannot be attributed (step
b).
Subject to a de minimis exception, an MNE’s residual profit is allocated to a destination
country following this calculation whether it sells goods or services through a local legal
entity, local branch, or remotely. With respect to the calculation of residual profit, the
RPA-I thus departs from existing PE threshold and attribution rules. We discuss this
further below. For ease of illustration, the MNE in our example has affiliates (a subsid-
iary or a branch) in each country where third party sales are made. But the same cal-
culation would be made if there were none.48
Another important point is whether the calculation of residual profit is carried out at
the level of the MNE as a whole, or separately for specific products or product lines.
46 We envisage that changes in the value of inventories are not used in the identification of residual
profit, but that the value is included only when the item is sold, and the location of the customer is
revealed.
47 We discuss implementation issues below for the case in which there is no affiliate in a market country.
48 If in our example goods were sold remotely to consumers in D, RGI in D would be calculated as: reve-
nues from third party sales in D less the deemed transfer price for the deemed purchase of goods from
B. This calculation is made even if no goods were actually sold to an affiliate in D. A share of non-allocable
costs would then be deducted to produce the residual profit to be taxed in D.
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Many MNEs keep profit and loss statements by product or product lines for non-tax
purposes. Thus, for example, a pharmaceutical company is likely to measure the prof-
itability of each of its drugs that materially contribute to overall profitability. A con-
sumer goods company is likely to measure the profitability of each of its substantial
branded products or product lines. There may be advantages to undertaking the cal-
culation of the residual profit on a product-line basis; we discuss this further below.
We now discuss each of these steps in more detail, using the on-going example set out
above, in which an MNE develops and manufactures products that are sold to third-
party customers. Of course, the system would also apply to other situations, most im-
portantly the provision of services to third-party customers. But the sale of tangible
goods most easily illustrates how the system could work.
a. Residual Gross Income (RGI)
The starting point in any determination of residual profits with respect to the sale of
products is actual third-party revenues arising in a particular market. These are set out
in Table 1.
We next need to deduct the allocable costs associated with the sales of goods and ser-
vices by each affiliate. These include costs of goods sold and local sales and market-
icosts.
 For transactions with third parties, these costs are based on the prices paid.
 For (actual or deemed) transactions with related parties, these costs are based on
deemed transfer prices. These prices are set when calculating the routine profit
earned by the affiliates providing the goods or services to the affiliate in the market
country. In our example the manufacturing cost is incurred in B. The routine profit
mark-up on (part of) this cost constitutes the routine profit to be taxed in B. The
mark-up has a second use: it is added to the cost to provide the price at which A
and C are deemed to purchase the goods from B. These two types of costs are re-
flected in our ongoing example.
The cost of goods sold is determined under standard accounting principles. Thus, for
example, if a local sales and marketing affiliate earned revenues attributable to three
products manufactured in a number of different affiliate-owned factories, it would de-
termine its cost of goods for each product based on the transfer price it paid to each
factory affiliate.
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The deemed transfer price used in determining the value of purchases from a related
party would be based on the costs of the related party, plus the routine profit allocated
on the basis of those costs. In our example, the per unit cost of goods sold is higher in
country C (3) than it is in countries A and B (2.5). This cost is made up of the purchase
of an intermediate good in all three cases at a price of 1 per unit, and additional costs
of 2 per unit for goods sold in C, and 1.5 per unit for goods sold in A and B. The routine
mark-up on the additional costs v is assumed to be 10%, which determines an effective
transfer price per unit of 2.65 for sales in A and B, and a transfer price per unit of 3.2
for sales in C.
Table 3 sets out the value of transfers from B to A and to C for the goods produced in
B. For example, the total value of the transfer of 96 units to A consists of the costs of
intermediate goods purchased by B (of 96), plus additional allocable costs incurred by
B of 144 and the routine profit associated with those other costs of 14.4. The transfer
value is therefore 254.4, equal to 96 units at a price of 2.65 per unit. Table 3 shows the
similar calculation for sales to the affiliate in C, and also the allocable costs which re-
main in the affiliate in B.
Table 3. Within-group transactions of goods: cost of goods sold
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Quantity sold to third parties 96 24 80 200
Quantity sold between affiliates (+) 176 176
Quantity purchased between affiliates (-) -96 -80 -176
Allocable costs of intermediate goods in B 96 24 80 200
Other allocable costs in B 144 36 60 340
Associated routine profit in B 14.4 3.6 6 34
Total allocable costs incurred 254.4 63.6 256 574
Value of transfer -254.4 510.4 -256.0 0
For the affiliate in B, the allocable cost of goods sold can be calculated in two ways.
First, it can be built up from the underlying allocable costs, as shown in Table 3, which
yields a total allocable cost of 63.6. Alternatively, it can be calculated as the total costs
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incurred by B in manufacturing, of 540, plus the associated routine profit of 34, less the
value of the transfers to A and C of 254.4 and 256 respectively, which again yields 63.6.
The final step in determining RGI in each destination country is to deduct the routine
profit allocated to each affiliate in a market country on its (non-manufacturing) direct
costs, which in the example consist of local sales and marketing functions. In our ex-
ample this routine profit is calculated as a 5% mark-up on local sales and marketing
costs. 200, 40 and 180 in local sales and marketing costs are incurred in countries A, B
and C respectively, yielding routine profit from these activities of 10, 2 and 9 respec-
tively, as shown in Table 2. The sum of the costs plus the routine profits are deducted
from third party revenues in calculating RGI: 210, 42 and 189 in countries A, B and C
respectively.
Note that the tax paid on routine profit is not deducted from sales revenues in calcu-
lating RGI in a market country.
We are now in a position to calculate the RGI in each country and affiliate. In our ex-
ample, each affiliate has third party revenues, local sales and marketing costs and costs
of goods sold. Table 4 combines these elements to derive their RGIs.
Table 4. Residual Gross Income
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Third party revenues 960 240 1,200 2,400
Less allocable costs:
Cost of goods sold 254.4 63.6 256 574
Sales & Marketing: Local 210 42 189 441
Residual Gross Income (RGI) 495.6 134.4 755 1,385
Proportion of RGI in each affiliate 35.8% 9.7% 54.5% 100%
In our example, total RGI is 1,385. There is a significant contrast to the allocation of
routine profit (shown in Table 2). The affiliate in C has RGI of 755 (54.5% of the total),
reflecting the greater profitability arising in C due to the higher price that can be
charged for goods to third-party customers. The affiliate in A has RGI of 495.6 (35.8%
of the total), reflecting the large quantity of units that it sells, albeit at a lower rate of
profit per unit. The affiliate in B sells a relatively small quantity, which is reflected in
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RGI of only 134.4 (9.7% of the total). The shares of RGI are important in determining
the apportionment of non-allocable costs, as we now describe.
b. Non-allocable costs
We must next account for costs (and any associated routine profit) that cannot be at-
tributed to any specific outputs or sales. Since these costs are by definition not attribut-
able to specific outputs, they are shared between affiliates in market countries on the
basis of some apportionment formula. These principles can be applied to each of the
material categories of non-allocable expenses: general sales and marketing, general
and administrative, research and development and interest expense. In effect all such
costs of a multinational group would be charged out to the affiliates in the market ju-
risdictions that sell products to third parties. Under the RPA-I the apportionment factor
is RGI, but as discussed below other factors could be used, including sales.
General and administrative (G&A) expenses by definition do not relate to specific prod-
ucts or product lines. For non-tax purposes MNEs often do not include them when an-
alysing the contribution of specific products or product lines to overall profitability.
OECD transfer pricing guidelines and the rules of most countries permit affiliates incur-
ring such expenses to charge them out to other affiliates only in circumstances where
an affiliate directly benefits from the G&A expense. Thus, MNEs may end up deducting
a substantial portion of these expenses only in the country where the original expense
is incurred. However, given that these expenses benefit broad categories of income
generated by MNEs in different jurisdictions, it would seem more appropriate that they
be allocated to those jurisdictions.49 As with other expenses, the routine profit associ-
ated with these expenses must also be apportioned to market affiliates and deducted
in the determination of residual profit; otherwise that element of profit would be in-
cluded both under routine and residual profit.
Like G&A expense, research and development (R&D) expenditures cannot typically be
identified with particular products or product lines because much of the costs relate to
49 This allocation could be made to the income of all affiliates including those that earn only routine
returns. But that would add unnecessary complexity without changing the result. If G&A expenses and
a mark-up on those expenses are allocated, for example, to a manufacturing affiliate or an affiliate
providing logistics services, that would increase the prices they are deemed to charge to selling affiliates
by the amount of the cost. Charging G&A costs directly to the selling affiliates achieves the same result
more simply.
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potential new products (including products that ultimately fail) and not just new ver-
sions of existing products. Consequently, it may be appropriate that R&D expenditures,
together with the related routine profit, should be apportioned among market affili-
ates according to products and product lines. For MNEs that are conglomerates or oth-
erwise have different lines of businesses in terms of their research intensity (e.g. phar-
maceutical companies that sell over the counter consumer products as well as pa-
tented prescription drugs), tax authorities and the taxpayer may agree to apportion
R&D expense separately for different lines of business. But in other cases, synergies
between different businesses may dictate that R&D expenses be apportioned over all
the lines of business of a multinational. This may give some scope for businesses to
choose a split between lines of business that brings some tax advantage. While this
cannot be ruled out, the principle here is that for the expense to be apportioned to a
particular line of business, there must be some genuine connection with that line of
business.
In determining the R&D expenditures to be charged to an affiliate, it is important that
all costs, including for example, employee incentive compensation (e.g. stock options),
be taken into account in some manner.50 It may be appropriate for the routine profit
on the R&D activities to be higher than that provided, for example, for marketing or
G&A activities, given the value of the activity. But even for “cutting edge” research,
independent research organizations can usually be identified that are engaged in those
activities on a services basis. Thus, the routine profit should reflect the financial data
of the most comparable independent research organizations.
Table 5 illustrates the apportionment of non-allocable expenses in our on-going exam-
ple. We start with the total non-allocable costs taken from Table 1, all of which (600)
are incurred by the affiliate in country A. We then add a routine profit for these activi-
ties calculated as a mark up on these costs - (45) taken from Table 2. This total is then
apportioned in proportion of RGI in each country, as derived in Table 4. Since the affil-
iate in C has the highest share of RGI, it is allocated the highest share of non-allocable
costs.
50 This could be an area of some difficulty to the extent that the tax treatment of stock-based compen-
sation differs in different countries. But the presumption should be that the costs of stock-based com-
pensation should be charged out like other employee compensation.
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Table 5. Apportionment of non-allocable costs with mark-up, by RGI
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Total non-allocable costs, including routine
profit 645
Proportion of RGI in each affiliate 35.8% 9.7% 54.5% 100%
Apportionment to each affiliate 230.8 62.6 351.6 645
As with the case of allocating the cost of goods sold to the affiliate that undertook the
expenditure, it might be noted that there are two ways of calculating the apportion-
ment of non-allocable costs for the affiliate undertaking the expenditure. In our exam-
ple, this is the affiliate in A. One approach, used in Table 5, is simply to assign a share
based on the total non-allocable costs and the proportion of RGI in that affiliate. An
approach that is closer to a transfer pricing approach would be (i) to deduct the entire
costs of the expenditure in A (600), together with the associated routine profit (45),
and (ii) to charge the other two affiliates their share of the costs – in this case 62.6 from
B and 351.6 from C. This yields the same charge to A, of 230.8.
The residual profit in each market affiliate is now straightforward to calculate. In our
example, we begin with RGI as derived in Table 4, and simply deduct the apportion-
ment of non-allocable costs and related routine profit from Table 5. As in the case of
allocable costs, the tax paid on the routine profit allocated for functions and activities
relating to non-allocable costs is not deducted from sales revenues when calculating
residual profit in market countries.
Since non-allocable costs are apportioned according to the proportion of total RGI in
each market affiliate, it follows that the proportion of residual profit allocated to each
affiliate is the same as the proportion of RGI. This is shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Residual Profit
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
RGI 495.6 134.4 755 1,385
Less apportionment of below the line ex-
penses -230.8 -62.6 -351.6 -645
Residual Profit 264.8 71.8 403.4 740
. Proportion of RGI in each affiliate / Share
of residual profit 35.8% 9.7% 54.5% 100.0%
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3.2. A top-down approach
An alternative approach to identifying the residual profit in each market affiliate is a
“top-down” approach. Under this approach, the total residual profit of the MNE is first
calculated, and then apportioned between the relevant market affiliates.
Under the RPA-I, the apportionment is again based on the RGI. This means that the
first step in the “bottom-up” approach is necessary even in the “top-down” approach.
For other RPA schemes this would not necessarily be the case; for example, apportion-
ing by sales would not require the calculation of RGI.
In our example, residual profit is 720. This can be calculated simply by deducting total
routine profit of 120 (Table 2) from total profit of 840 (Table 1). Table 7 applies the
proportion of RGI in each affiliate to total residual profit. The resulting apportionment
is identical to that in Table 6, following the “bottom-up” approach.
Table 7. Residual Profit using the “top-down” approach
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Total Residual Profit 740
Proportion of RGI in each affiliate 35.8% 9.7% 54.5% 100%
Residual Profit 264.8 71.8 403.4 740
4. Further Issues
Although we have set out the basic mechanics of how the RPA-I would operate, a num-
ber of further design issues arise. We discuss these issues here. Further implementa-
tion issues are discussed in Section VI below.
A starting point is the aggregation of routine and residual profit. This is, of course,
straightforward. It is shown for our example in Table 8.
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Table 8. Routine and Residual Profit
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Routine Profit 55 36 9 100
Residual Profit 264.8 71.8 403.4 740
Total Profit 319.8 107.8 412.4 840
A first issue is the relevance of the aggregation of routine and residual profit, which
depends on the tax rates that are applied. If a country applies the same tax rates to
both elements of profit, then it makes sense for that country simply to aggregate the
two into a single tax base. This would also make it easier to set-off residual losses
against routine profits. However, it is possible that countries may choose to apply dif-
ferent rates to routine and residual profits. It might be, for instance, that functions
generating routine profits are readily relocated in relation to tax considerations,
whereas the allocation of residual profits largely on a destination basis provides a less
mobile tax base that can support a higher rate. The separation of routine and residual
profits in the way described here offers countries the opportunity to use different tax
rates.
A second issue concerns the definition of the tax base, and in particular whether a har-
monised definition of the tax base is required for use in all countries participating in
the RPA-I. This is clearly an important issue in the EU Commission’s consideration of its
CCCTB proposal, which is based on a formulary apportionment approach. Indeed, its
2016 proposal consists of two steps: coordination of the tax base in the first step, and
consolidation in the second. There is not a common definition amongst states in the
USA, which also operate a formulary apportionment approach, although many states
refer to the federal tax base. The transfer pricing interpretation of the RPA-I suggests
that perfect harmonisation is not required. As long as the routine profit is based on a
reasonable definition of the tax base in the country in which functions and activities
take place, then transfer prices determining the allocation of residual profit to other
countries can also be based on those definitions. Where a country seeks to offer an
inducement to greater expenditure – for example by offering an incentive to undertake
R&D – these should in principle operate outside the system described here. We discuss
this issue further in Section VI.
We now turn to discussing three other important issues in more detail: splitting total
profit into its routine and residual components in the case of remote sales; defining
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which forms of expenditure should be included in the base for a mark-up on costs to
determine routine profit; the allocation of interest expense; and the treatment of
losses.
4.1. Routine and residual profit in the case of remote sales
Where a MNE has a local affiliate – either a subsidiary or a branch – in the market
country, then the residual profit in that market country can be calculated as described
above, and assigned to that local affiliate. However, there are many cases in which a
business may make a direct sale to a customer in a different country, without there
being a local affiliate. This is especially important for digital sales, whether or not the
good or service is provided digitally.
Currently, if the MNE does not have a subsidiary or permanent establishment (PE) in
the market country, then the profit associated with the sale is attributed to the selling
entity; there is no allocation to the market country. The RPA-I by contrast would seek
to assign residual profit to the market country, subject to a de-minimis rule. If, under
the RPA-I, residual profit on direct exports was not taxed in the market country, this
could lead to a significant distortion to the structure and location of MNEs, which
would need to choose whether to pay tax on residual profit in the market jurisdiction
(by maintaining a local affiliate) or elsewhere (by not maintaining a local affiliate).
It is therefore important to apply the principles of the RPA-I also to remote sales across
countries. This is a significant departure from current practice.51 For example, suppose
that a German business sells remotely only to French consumers, without any current
taxable presence in France. Currently, the profit on the transaction would be taxed
only in Germany. However, the RPA-I would allocate routine profit to Germany and
residual profit to France, according to the calculations set out above. The references
to deemed transfer prices above therefore go beyond their traditional role of allocating
profits amongst subsidiaries of the MNE. In effect the RPA-I requires the use of deemed
transfer prices to calculate the residual profit in a market country whether the
51 As discussed below, this departure from current practice would require change to existing double tax
treaties. However, it would not breach customary international law. Customary international law re-
quires that taxing rights are based on a genuine link (nexus) between the taxpayer, the taxable event
and the taxing jurisdiction. This genuine link can be personal or territorial. Selling into a market is
deemed to provide a genuine link between the foreign business being taxed and the market country for
these purposes.
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provision of goods or services in that country is made through a local subsidiary, a local
branch or remotely.
Of course, it is also necessary to implement this requirement in practice; the remote
seller may wish to evade any tax in the market country. To induce the seller to declare
and pay tax on the residual profit, the tax authority in the market country could per-
haps charge a withholding tax on sales, which would be creditable against any tax col-
lected on the residual profit.
This element of the RPA-I clearly adds some complexity relative to the existing sys-
tem.52 We discuss some more practical issues relating to this in Section VII. However,
it is worth repeating that references in this Chapter to transfers amongst affiliates of a
MNE should be taken also to include deemed transfers in cases where there is no sub-
sidiary or any physical presence whatsoever in market countries.
4.2. Interest expense
We have not yet discussed how to deal with interest expenses, and we have left inter-
est out of our base case example. Since the intention of the RPA-I is to match the ex-
isting system as closely as possible, whilst removing its most significant problems, then
it seems natural for the RPA-I tax base to permit a deduction for interest payments in
determining both routine and residual profits.
In today’s world interest expense is one of the principal tools of tax planners. Because
MNE affiliates can adopt a wide variety of capital structures consistent with local tax
and corporate law, third party debt is disproportionately located in high tax countries
and within-company debt is used to erode the tax base of even relatively low-tax juris-
dictions. Given this reality, it is not surprising that limiting interest deductions was con-
sidered in detail by the OECD in its BEPS project.53 One option considered by the OECD
was to limit the deductions of third party and intercompany interest expense based on
52 Note that similar issues arise under the DBCFT and recent proposals to tax highly digitalized busi-
nesses.
53 OECD (2015).
(continued)
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a ratio derived from the multinational group’s aggregate third party interest cost di-
vided by a measure of income or assets.54
In a system that imputes routine returns to most functions and activities and residual
returns to market countries, it seems reasonable to allocate third party interest ex-
pense on a group ratio basis much as specified by the OECD in this option. But if the
intention is to allocate third party interest expense within the multinational, there
seems no reason also to permit a deduction for within-company interest expense.
The OECD did not recommend a direct allocation provision (i.e. a direct charge-out to
affiliates of third-party interest costs) because many countries were uncomfortable
granting an interest deduction in their jurisdiction for an expense incurred by other
affiliates in other jurisdictions. Instead, the OECD proposed a limitation on the amount
of third-party and intercompany interest incurred by an affiliate that can be deducted
by that affiliate, but supplemented this with a 'group ratio rule' which permits higher
net interest deductions, based on the financial ratio of its worldwide group. However,
the RPA-I system requires overcoming that discomfort more broadly, with G&A, R&D
and global sales and marketing expenses being apportioned among market jurisdic-
tions as described above. As a result, allocating third party interest expense to each
affiliate of the MNE addresses the debt-shifting problem in a way that is congruent
with the general design of the RPA-I. This solution is also conceptually appealing given
that money is fungible, and, therefore, interest paid on third-party debt is best seen as
benefiting all affiliates of a multinational group.55
That leaves open the basis of the allocation of third-party interest expense. One option
would be to base the allocation of interest according to the location of the tangible
assets of the business.56 This could be on the grounds that the third-party debt is es-
sentially used for the purposes of purchasing assets. Compared to basing the allocation
on income or sales, this would have the merit of being relatively stable, and less prone
to fluctuations due to market conditions. On the other hand, the exclusion of intangible
54 OECD BEPS Report on Action 4: Limitations on Interest Deductions. Another option considered by the
OECD was a fixed ratio (e.g., 10-30% of earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes, or EBITDA).
55 Note that relief should be given for net interest payments only; if relief were given for gross interest
payments, then it would be possible to reduce taxes by borrowing from, and lending back to, the same
party,
56 This was proposed by Graetz (2008), although that paper also noted the possibility of basing the allo-
cation on income; in a similar vein: Hey (2014); Desai/Dharmapala (2015) p.663 et seq. note that this
proposal does not satisfy “capital ownership neutrality” as the tax effect of new investment would de-
pend on the overall asset distribution of competing investors in a multinational setting
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assets raises some concerns. Furthermore, there is considerable merit in basing the
allocation on the same factor as the allocation for the purposes of residual profit of
non-allocable expenses, namely RGI. This would mean that it would not be necessary
to identify and value all of the tangible assets of a worldwide business, as well as its
RGI. Then again, it could be argued that the countries which earn only a routine profit
should also bear some of the interest expense, which would suggest an allocation
based on total taxable income – that is routine profit plus residual profit, rather than
just RGI. Having gone through the steps set out above, that could be readily calculated
within the context of the RPA-I.57
4.3. Taxable losses
Of course, not all multinationals generate positive residual profits in all destination
countries. Three types of loss need to be considered:
 Total residual profit of the MNE is positive, but it is negative in at least one jurisdic-
tion, and positive in other jurisdictions;
 Total worldwide profit is positive, but less than the sum of routine profits, so that
total residual profit is negative; and
 Total worldwide profit is negative.
It is necessary to identify a strategy within the RPA-Ito deal with all three types of loss.
We begin with the first, where the MNE makes a positive total residual profit. To illus-
trate this case, suppose that there are two destination countries, X and Y, with tax rates
of 20% and 40% respectively. Suppose further that RGI in the two countries is -50 in X
and +100 in Y, giving a total RGI of +50. Finally, suppose that non-allocable costs are
40, implying that aggregate residual profit is 10.
Following the procedures set out above, the weight for apportioning non-allocable
country X is -1 (i.e. -50/+50) and the weight for country Y is +2 (i.e. 100/50). RGI in X is
57 Since routine profits are determined based on operating income, which is determined without regard
to interest expense of either the relevant affiliate or the comparables, allocating some interest expense
to affiliates earning routine profits would not require any adjustment to their transfer prices with other
affiliates.
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therefore increased by 40, to reach a residual profit in X of -10. RGI in Y is reduced by
80, to reach a residual profit in Y of 20.
Another way of thinking about this is that the effective rate of deduction for non-allo-
cable costs is a weighted average of the tax rates in the destination country. In cases
where all destination countries have a positive RGI, then the weighted average tax rate
applied for deducting non-allocable costs would lie within the tax rates in each country
(e.g. if X and Y both had RGI of 50, the weighted average tax rate would be 30%). How-
ever, when RGI is negative in one country, this no longer holds. In the example in the
previous paragraph, there is a negative weight of -1 for apportioning non-allocable
costs to X, and a weight of +2 for apportioning non-allocable costs to B. Specifically, in
this example then, the weighted average effective rate of deduction for non-allocable
costs is 60%.
This appears to create potential problems. First, the taxable residual loss in X becomes
smaller the higher are non-allocable costs. This is at the expense of revenue in Y, which
in effect gives relief for more than 100% of non-allocable costs. Second, the effective
rate of deduction of non-allocable costs is very high, and it is possible to construct ex-
amples where the effective rate of deduction exceeds 100%. This may induce unnec-
essary spending on non-allocable costs and could potentially generate profit shifting
opportunities.
Two alternative approaches are possible. One would be to apportion non-allocable
costs only between destination countries that have a positive RGI. In our example, that
would mean that all non-allocable costs would be apportioned to Y. Y would then have
residual profit of 60, an X would have a negative residual profit of -50. This would be a
taxable loss that could in principle be carried forwards (or backwards) to offset against
a positive residual profit in other years. If there is routine profit in X, then the residual
loss could also be set against the routine profit.
A second approach would be a top-down approach in which total residual profit were
only apportioned to countries with a positive RGI. In this case in our example, X would
be treated as having zero residual profit, and the total residual profit of 10 would be
apportioned to Y. In our example, this might be seen as a more extreme outcome than
simply applying the usual approach with negative weights, since in this case the taxable
loss in X has in effect been transferred entirely to Y.
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In the discussion so far, we have not considered any adjustment to routine profit in the
presence of losses. However, in the second and third cases identified, total profit is less
than measured total routine profit. This requires us to consider whether the allocation
of routine profit should be adjusted in such circumstances. On considering this, a start-
ing point is to ask what principle should be applied to where losses should be identified
for tax purposes. The concept of the routine profit is intended to reflect the profit
earned by a third party whose return is independent of the overall success or failure of
the product or business to which its activities relate. It functions essentially as a service
provider. Its only risks reflect that the buyer of its goods or services is unable to pay for
those goods and services. That in turn implies that, for tax purposes, the overall risk is
borne where the residual profit is located: in the market country.
When residual profit is high, the market country has a higher tax base. When residual
profit is negative, then arguably the destination country should give relief, while the
origin country, where expenditure is undertaken, still collects tax on the same routine
profit. Based on this argument, that would be the case whether or not the business
had made an absolute loss, or merely failed to cover its routine taxable profit. This
approach would follow the logic of the arm’s length principle that the risk of loss should
be allocated to the jurisdictions where the residual profits would be allocable if such
profits were to exist. That would aid certainty and ease of administration because a
taxpayer would know its income taxable in jurisdictions earning routine returns based,
for example, on local cost projections alone, without regard to the level of global prof-
its for the relevant products. But – if losses are not immediately rebated in the market
country - such a rule could lead to MNEs being taxed on amounts that exceed global
profits, possibly over long periods of time.
In any case, this is perhaps to go too far. If the rate of mark-up used to determine
routine profit is actually intended to approximate the risk-free rate, then the argument
that the origin country should always be able to tax the routine profit – whatever the
level of profit – makes sound economic sense. But to the extent that the routine profit
includes some element of aggregate risk, in profitable times the origin country also has
a higher tax base to reflect that risk. It should therefore be expected to accept part of
the risk that the business does not earn at least the routine profit.
A reasonable conceptual position might therefore be that the total routine profit is
limited to the actual total profit earned by the business. Where total profit is positive
but less than the level normally calculated for routine profit, then total routine profit
should be reduced to be equal to total profit, and the market country should have a
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zero tax base. In this case routine profits subject to tax would not exceed total profits
of the multinational group for that particular product. Where total profit is negative,
the tax base in the origin country should fall to zero, and a loss should be recorded in
the market country. In that way the losses allocable to market countries would be lim-
ited to each such country’s share of overall group losses.
This approach is illustrated in Table 10. In the first column, the firm earns revenue of
1,600; in the second it earns revenue of 1,400. In both cases, it has total expenses of
1,500. Assuming a 10% mark-up on costs, that would imply a routine profit of 150 in
both cases. However, given revenues, total profit is 100 in the first column, and -100
in the second column. In both cases, then routine profit as normally calculated exceeds
actual total profit. The approach suggested here would be to reduce routine profit in
the first column to total profit, of 100. Residual profit in this column is therefore zero.
In the more extreme case of the second column, the routine profit is reduced to zero,
and the loss is attributed to the market country through the residual profit.
Even if this approach were followed, however, several questions remain. First, alt-
hough this may give an overall assignment to routine and residual profit, it does not
necessarily identify the tax base in each country. Should the routine profit be reduced
proportionately in every origin country, or should that reduction reflect the nature and
reason for the loss? For example, suppose that the product saw declining sales and
prices only in market country X, which was predominantly supplied from country Y.
Should the routine profit in Y therefore be disproportionately reduced?
Table 10. A potential allocation of the tax base with low profit and with a loss
Positive profit Negative profit
Revenues 1,600 1,400
Expenses 1,500 1,500
Aggregate profit / loss 100 -100
Routine profit if positive residual profit at 10%
mark-up 150 150
Routine profit 100 0
Residual profit 0 -100
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Second, the mechanism for reducing the routine profit in any country is not clear. Un-
der the basic RPA-I, origin countries would not need to have information on the profit
of the MNE as a whole, but only on costs incurred in that jurisdiction. If the approach
set out here were to be followed, then each origin country would also need to collect
information about the overall profitability of each business with expenses within that
country.
Third, suppose that there is not an immediate rebate for losses, but that losses must
be carried forward to set against future profit arising in the same country. Then timing
differences might yield asymmetric outcomes: the location of sales in loss years may
be significantly different than the location of sales in excess profit years. That problem
could potentially be dealt with by providing a priority allocation of residual profits in
later years to jurisdictions of earlier year losses, effectively “recapturing” those losses.
It is not clear whether such additional complexity would be worthwhile.
Another option would be that origin countries identify and carry forward the shortfall
in the routine profit. In the example, this would amount to a carry forward to 50 in
column 1 of Table [10], and 150 in column 2. When the total profit of the business is
sufficiently high, the origin countries would raise taxes on routine profits until the car-
ried forward shortfall had been exhausted. Residual profit would be defined to be net
of such additional routine profit in any year. This would mean that the market countries
would wait longer until a tax paying position is resumed. Again, while this is defensible
conceptually, it is not clear whether the additional complexity required would be
worthwhile.
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IV. COMPARING THE RPA-I WITH OTHER APPROACHES
The RPA-I described above has similarities with, but also important differences from,
other proposals for a reformed international tax architecture. This section compares
the RPA-I with some of these prominent proposals and with some further options
within the RPA family of tax schemes.
Options within the RPA family of schemes differ on a number of key design features,
including: the calculation of routine profit, the locations to which residual profit is al-
located, the formula used in that allocation, and whether the scheme is applied on a
product-line or a business-wide basis. Subsection 1 discusses other options for allo-
cating residual profit, both the jurisdiction to which it is allocated, and the formula
used for that allocation. Subsection 2 specifically comments on other proposed RPA
schemes, in particular, those proposed by Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, and by Luck-
haupt, Overesch and Schreiber. It also discusses sales-based formulary apportion-
ment, which is a further step from the RPA-I, but which bears some similarity to it
given its formulary features and its use of the destination principle. Finally, it also dis-
cusses a proposal by Schreiber and Fell for what is effectively a minimum tax in the
destination country, which also has similar properties.
1. Alternative allocations of residual profit
The RPA-I allocates residual profit according to the share of the MNE’s aggregate RGI
attributed to each market jurisdiction. But one can conceive of many other ways in
which residual profit could be allocated. We here discuss allocating the residual profit
by sales revenue, costs and other factors, including users of digital products. We also
briefly discuss allowing countries to negotiate how to divide the residual.
Note that for residual profit to be allocated in proportion to sales revenues, costs or
other factors, the allocation must be done through a top-down approach. This is be-
cause, as we discuss below, the top-down and bottom-up approaches are not equiva-
lent if the allocation is not based on RGI.
Table 11 reports the outcome of allocating the residual profit in our basic example ac-
cording to RGI, sales and costs using the top-down approach. Routine profit is not af-
fected by this comparison.
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Table 11: Allocation of residual profit by different factors
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Proportion of RGI in each affiliate 35.8% 9.7% 54.5% 100%
Apportionment using RGI 264.8 71.8 403.4 740
Proportion of sales in each affiliate 40.0% 10.0% 50.0% 100%
Apportionment using sales 296 74 370 740
Proportion of costs in each affiliate 51.3% 37.2% 11.5% 100%
Apportionment using costs 379.5 275.1 85.4 740
Allocation of Residual Profit by Sales Revenue
One obvious alternative is to allocate by sales revenue, taking full advantage of the
relative immobility of the location of final sales. This gives the same allocation of resid-
ual profit as by RGI if the ratio of the final selling price to the allocable cost per unit
(including the routine profit) were the same in all countries. But in general – and in our
example – this is not the case. In our example, both the allocable cost per unit and the
selling price per unit are higher in C than in A and B. But the proportionate difference
in the price is greater than the proportionate difference in costs. C is therefore more
profitable per unit, implying that it has a higher proportion of RGI than of sales. Coun-
tries like C, with higher profitability – measured as the ratio of sales to non-allocable
costs - thus benefit from an allocation by RGI compared to allocation by sales reve-
nue.58
Allocation by RGI and sales revenue both bring the benefits that accrue from a partial
move to a destination basis of taxation, discussed in Chapter 4 above. But allocation
by RGI offers a number of advantages over allocation by sales. First, allocation by RGI
has some intuitive appeal over allocation by sales because it rewards countries with
higher profitability. For example, if a country has relatively high prices for drugs com-
pared to other countries and hence higher RGI, it could be argued that country’s tax
revenues should reflect the higher prices. Similarly, if a country does not protect patent
or trademark rights so that local profit margins are relatively low, it could be argued
58 This is so whatever the cause of the higher profitability. Sales in country Y can be more profitable than
sales in country Z because: (i) higher prices can be charged in Y than in Z on the sale of goods having the
same cost, (ii) because goods can be sold at the same price in Y and Z even if the goods sold in Y have a
lower cost, or (iii) as in our basic example, goods sold in Y have a higher price and higher cost than those
sold in Z, but the difference between price and cost in Y is greater than that in Z.
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that that country should not benefit from the higher margins in other countries with
stricter protections.
Second, the bottom up approach can be used to allocate residual profit in proportion
to RGI but not sales. Compare the results of an allocation of residual profit by sales
using a top down approach (Table 11, above) with the results of a bottom up approach
(Table 12, below).
Table 12: Bottom-up approach: allocation of residual profit by sales
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
RGI 495.6 134.4 755 1,385
Proportion of sales in each affiliate 40% 10% 50% 100%
Apportionment of non-allocable costs by
sales 258 64.5 322.5 645
Residual Profit 237.6 69.9 432.5 740
32.1% 9.4% 58.4% 100%
Clearly the top-down and bottom-up approaches do not give the same result when
using sales revenue as the apportionment factor. This is because under the bottom-up
approach only non-allocable expenses are allocated by sales, while under the top-
down approach all expenses are allocated by sales. The bottom up approach thus can-
not be used to allocate residual profit in proportion to sales.59
A bottom up approach – and hence allocating residual profit by RGI rather than sales –
has practical appeal because its operation is closer to the existing system than the top
down approach. Practitioners, revenue authorities and others steeped in the existing
system will thus find the bottom up approach more familiar, intuitive, and perhaps
even palatable, than the top-down approach.
Third, allocation by sales revenue can lead to instances of economic inefficiency that
do not arise under allocation by RGI. This can be seen in the following example. To
begin with we set out the case with RGI as the apportionment factor.
59 Non-allocable costs could be allocated by sales rather than RGI under the bottom up approach as
done in Table 12, but this would result in an allocation of residual profit that is neither in proportion to
sales nor RGI. It is not clear what benefits this would bring over the allocation of non-allocable costs by
RGI.
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Suppose that a business is operating in country A and faces the RPA-I in A at rates of
20% on both its routine and residual profit. It produces 100 units of a good at a cost of
10 per unit and is able to sell the goods for 18 per unit. The routine profit on its pro-
duction activities is calculated as a 10% mark-up on costs. It therefore makes a pre-tax
total profit of 800, of which routine profit is 100, and residual profit is 700. In total it
pays tax of 160.
It now considers producing and selling in country B. Specifically, it could produce 200
units in B, also at a cost of 10 per unit. However, it can only sell these additional units
in B at a price of 11 per unit . This is a nevertheless a profitable investment; the firm
requires an after-tax profit of 7% to go ahead (equivalent to the rate of routine mark-
up less tax). The project yields a pre-tax profit of 200. Suppose that B also operates the
RPA-I, at a rate of 30%. Routine profit in B is 200, on which tax is due of 60. Residual
profit is zero. After tax, the firm would make a profit of 140, a rate of return of 7%. The
project would therefore go ahead under the RPA-I in both countries.
Now suppose that residual profit is allocated on the basis of sales. Total residual profit
is 700. Total sales are 4,000: 1,800 in A and 2,200 in B. Hence the allocation of residual
profit is 315 to A and 385 to B. This leads to a tax liability on residual profit of 63 in A,
and a tax liability of 115.5 in B, in addition to the tax on routine profit of 20 in A and 60
in B. The total tax liability is therefore now 258.5 – an increase of 98.5 due to the pro-
ject in B being undertaken. This means that the post-tax profit from the investment in
B is only 101.5, a rate of return of only 5.1% - and less than the required rate of return
of the business. In this case, the project would not go ahead.
This example illustrates a broader and important point. Allocating residual profit by
sales can clearly shift taxable profits earned from sales in one country (in the example,
country A) into another (in this case country B). In the example, part of the residual
profit (385) initially earned in A is effectively transferred to B for tax purposes. Because
the tax rate in B is higher, this made the new project in B uneconomic. On the other
hand, a lower tax rate in B could have turned an uneconomic project into one worth
undertaking, as we show in the example below. The general point is that allocation by
sales can affect real economic decisions, including basic investment decisions of the
kind in this example.
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Fourth, allocation by sales appears to give rise to tax planning opportunities that are
not available under allocation by RGI. Admittedly, one can also think of tax planning
opportunities that benefit from allocation by RGI over allocation by sales, but such
planning appears to be easier to address. We start by considering two tax planning
strategies that are available under allocation by sales but not allocation by RGI.
Allocation by sales revenues, unlike allocation by RGI, can be manipulated by increasing
sales revenues in low tax countries with low margins and hence little economic impact.
This could be done by purchasing a high-turnover, low-profit margin business in a low
tax country. The application of the RPA-I on a product line basis should provide some
protection against that, if the acquired business has a different product line. But this
protection is not complete to the extent that businesses may be acquired with similar
product lines.
Other techniques may be used. Let us return to the previous example, but now let us
suppose that the tax rate in B is zero. Under an allocation by sales, there would be an
aggregate tax saving of 77 relative to the case of not undertaking the investment in B,
as the 385 of residual profit transferred to B now escapes tax. Clearly in this case there
would be an incentive to undertake the investment in B even if it were loss making.
60,61
Both examples lie in the grey area between tax planning and real economic re-
sponses.62 They may be purely tax driven, but they require the taxpayer to undertake
real economic activities at a real cost to achieve a more substantial tax advantage.
Tax planning strategies can also be found which benefit from allocation by RGI rather
than by sales. Consider an example where a manufacturing business creates goods at
a cost of 100 in country A, and sells these goods to consumers, also in country A, for
150. The tax rate in country A is 30%. Assuming routine profit to be a 10% return on
60 Tax on residual profit in B would be 77, on residual profit in A would be 195.3, and tax on routine
profit in A would be 186.
61 This example could clearly be made more extreme by allowing the firm to make a loss on its sales in
B, and it would be possible to construct an example in which the loss is more than offset by lower tax in
A. We chose an example where residual gross income in B is zero in order to avoid any complications
arising from losses.
62 Examples under the existing system include inversions out of the US and moving people functions for
profit attribution and transfer pricing purposes.
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expenses, routine and residual profit in country A are 10 and 30 respectively and its
total tax liability is 12.
As a second step consider the case where the manufacturing business sells its goods
for 149 to an independent distributor in a tax haven, H.63 The distributor then sells the
goods to the same consumer in A for 150. Assume that the tax rate in H is zero and that
H Co has no expenses there. Whether residual profit is allocated by RGI or sales, this
planning strategy would result in a lowering of the manufacturer’s tax liability. It now
has routine profit of 10 in A taxed at 30% (3) and residual profit of 39 which is untaxed.
The distributor has no routine profit in H but has a residual profit of 1 in A taxed at 30%
(0.3).
As a final step consider the case where the distributor sells the goods back to the man-
ufacturer for 150, which in turn sells them to the same consumers for 150. In this case
allocating residual profit by RGI or by sales does make a difference. If residual profit is
allocated by RGI, A’s residual profit of 39 is untaxed in H;64 but if it is allocated by sales
it is split equally between H and in A.65 In this case, therefore, allocating residual profit
by RGI rather than by sales produces a better tax outcome for the manufacturer.
Countering tax planning of all types is challenging. But it appears to be more challeng-
ing the more real economic activity and cost the taxpayer has to undertake to achieve
the desired tax result. And it appears to be less challenging if it involves circular trans-
actions with no real, or very minimal, economic costs, as in the last example described
above.
Allocation of Residual Profit by Costs
Allocating by either RGI or sales might be felt, however, to allocate too little taxing right
to ‘origin’ countries. If so, one alternative would be to allocate the residual, or a portion
of the residual, –along the lines of the OECD’s for the “transactional profit split” - on
the basis of the functions and activities taking place in different countries.66 One
63 The difficulties that can arise as a result of the use of third-party distributors are discussed further in
Section V.1.b. below.
64 A Co’s RGI is 39 (149-110) in H and 0 in A (150-150).
65 A Co’s has sales of 149 in H and 150 in A. The proportion of total sales in each country is thus 50%.
66 For the allocation of the residual profit on the basis of a contribution analysis see: OECD (2018) para
2.150 et seq.; Schön (2010) p.235 et seq.; Couzin (2013) p.175 et seq.
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somewhat crude way of doing this would be to allocate residual profit (or a portion of
the residual),instead to where third party costs are incurred (although an alternative
would be to base the allocation on routine profit). The final panel of Table 11 illustrated
the outcome under an allocation based on costs. Clearly this change in allocation fac-
tors creates a very significant switch in the allocation of profit from country C (which
has 54.5% of the total RGI and 50% of revenues, but only 11.5% of the costs incurred)
to country B (which has only 9.7% of RGI and 10% of sales, but 37.2% of costs) and A
(which has 35.8% of RGI and 40% of sales, but 51.3% of costs). As a result, the allocation
of residual profit in B rises from 71.8 (by RGI) or 74 (by sales) to 275.1, that in A rises
from 264.8 (by RGI) or 296 (by sales) to 379.5, while the allocation of residual profit to
C falls from 403.4 (by RGI) or 370 (by sales) to 85,4.
While such an allocation may have some appeal in allocating tax base on something
approaching an ‘origin’ basis, the more the system is based on where functions and
activities take place, the more it would leave the system open to the existing problems
of economic inefficiencies and tax competition. This is because the improvement
brought by the RPA-I on these two fronts, relative to the existing system, stems from
the allocation of the residual to the market country.
Allocation of Residual Profit by Other Factors
There are of course many other ways in which residual profit could be allocated, in-
cluding by combining several factors. Building on the notion developed by the UK
Treasury, for example, one might consider allocating some part of residual profit to
countries where users of services offered by certain highly digitalised businesses are
located – HM Treasury (2018).67 Within the broad framework of an RPA, this could be
justified on the grounds that users, like consumers, are relatively immobile. Note that
this is a quite different rationale to that given by the UK Treasury, which justified its
proposal on the grounds that users create value. Allocating part of the residual in this
way would involve a number of conceptual and practical difficulties, not least defining
“users” and “digital businesses”.
Note that taxing rights can be allocated to countries where users of certain digital ser-
vices are located under the RPA-I, and therefore residual profit is allocated by RGI (the
67 For a critical evaluation of this proposal see Devereux and Vella (2018).
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same would be true of allocation by sales). This could be done by deeming sales of
advertising services to take place in the location of users on whose devices the adverts
appear, rather than the location of the buyer or seller of the advertising services.
Deeming the sales to take place in the location of the users would thus achieve an
allocation of taxing rights to countries where users of certain digital services are lo-
cated in line with the policy preferences of countries such as the United Kingdom.68
Allow countries to negotiate over the allocation of the residual
It is possible that countries would take different positions on these issues. That is, while
they may agree in principle to the RPA approach, they might differ in where they would
prefer residual profit to be taxed. Countries conceivably could test their “market
power” in this regard. If and to the extent that the profit represents location-specific
rents or quasi-rents, the origin country may be able to keep its share in the tax base. If
and to the extent that the profit is generated by mobile factors, the origin country will
probably lose parts of the tax base due to tax competition.
This could lead to some countries preferring to apportion residual profit by where func-
tions and activities take place, as described above, or by some combination of this this
location and the market country. Alternatively, countries could perhaps negotiate bi-
lateral arrangements with partner countries, though it is difficult to see how the ap-
portionment could be permitted to vary between tax payers. If there is no agreement
between countries, that raises the prospect of the residual profit potentially being
taxed twice though of course this may also happen if one or more countries introduce
the RPA unilaterally or if countries adopt the RPA universally but with different tax
68 This is an application of the broader rule that the destination or market jurisdiction for services is the
country of the service recipient not the service provider. For example, magazine advertisements should
be sourced to the country of readers and advertisements on digital services should be sourced to the
country of users of the service.
54
bases. This issue is also raised by the proposal put forward by Schreiber and Fell (2017)
set out below.
2. Other RPA proposals
As noted above, proposals similar to the RPA-I have been made by Avi-Yonah, Clausing
and Durst (2009) and Luckhaupt, Overesch and Schreiber (2012). They proposed split-
ting total profit into a routine component and a residual component. However, their
proposals differ from the RPA-I in a number of ways.
Both proposals move further away from the existing system, in that routine profit
would be determined by giving a mark-up for all expenses in a relatively arbitrary way,
without comparison to the level of routine profit that might be expected for specific
activities. Avi-Yonah et al proposed setting the rate of mark-up on expenses to 7.5 %;
Luckhaupt et al did not specify a particular rate. Clearly there is a trade-off here: a
single rate of mark-up applied to all expenses has the merit of simplicity, but the dis-
advantage that it is not able to distinguish cases where there might be legitimate dif-
ferences in the appropriate rate of mark-up.69 It also gives rise to the double counting
issue discussed above.
Moreover, the separate accounting approach used by the RPA-I presented here applies
at the product or product line level and can separately identify revenues and costs spe-
cifically attributable to those products in specific countries. The same approach is taken
in the proposal by Luckhaupt et al. In contrast, the proposal by Avi-Yonah et al simply
allocates all residual profit on the basis of sales. They do not trace through the allocable
costs for units sold in any particular market. As seen above, this can make an important
difference if the ratio of the final selling price to the allocable cost per unit (including
the routine profit) is not the same in all countries. Compared to the RPA-I, there is a
trade-off: the approach proposed by Avi-Yonah et al is simpler, but does not reflect as
well differing economic circumstances. The proposal by Luckhaupt et al is closer to the
RPA-I in that it effectively follows a bottom up approach to determine RGI in each mar-
ket jurisdiction, albeit using an arbitrary mark-up to determine routine profit.
69 The rate of mark-up would in effect be a policy parameter; for example, it could in principle be set
higher in low income countries, to expand their tax base. However, that would raise the question of
whether other countries would accept transfer prices based on a rate that was deliberately set higher
than comparables. A higher rate of mark-up would also act as a disincentive to locate functions and
activities in those countries.
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However, this proposal does not address the issue of how non-allocable costs should
be allocated between more than one destination country to determine residual profit.
We apply the approach proposed by Avi-Yonah et al to our example in Table 13. The
first line identifies routine profit in each location, using a 7.5% mark-up on all expenses
incurred in that jurisdiction, including on intermediate goods. In total, routine profit is
117, 7.5% of total costs of 1,560. That leaves a residual profit of 723 to be apportioned
by sales (an a top-down approach).
Table 13: Applying the Avi-Yonah, Clausing, Durst approach to our example
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Routine profit @ 7.5% of costs 60 43.5 13.5 117
Residual profit using sales apportionment 289.2 72.3 361.5 723
Total profit 349.2 115.8 375 840
c. Formulary apportionment
Formulary apportionment has been practiced in the United States and Canada for a
long time70 and is currently discussed as a model for the European Union on the basis
of the European Commission’s proposals for a “Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base” (CCCTB).71 A standard form of formulary apportionment which has been em-
ployed by most U.S. states in the past72 and which is also championed by the European
Commission73 would allocate profits to jurisdictions based on the location of three fac-
tors: labour, capital and sales.
70 Hellerstein (2013).
71 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) {SWD(2016)
341 final} {SWD(2016) 342 final}25.10.2016 COM(2016) 683 final 2016/0336 (CNS).
72 Hellerstein (2013).
73 Art.28 of the Draft CCCTB Directive supra
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In recent years, more and more U.S. states have moved towards a one-factor system
which uses only the point-of-sale as the decisive factor for the application of the shar-
ing mechanism.74 A main reason for doing so was to avoid the disincentives for locating
assets and payroll in a state, inherent in the use of those two factors in the apportion-
ment formula. This system has also been discussed for the international arena.75 Tak-
ing a closer look, this model - sales-based formula apportionment - bears some rela-
tionship to the RPA-I but there are fundamental differences.
First, and most fundamentally, traditional formulary apportionment allocates all of the
unitary profits of a multinational group by means of some weighting factors; all RPA
schemes on the other hand, allocate only residual profit in this way, with routine profits
allocated to the jurisdiction in which functions and activities take place. Under sales-
based formulary apportionment a MNE’s total profit is allocated by sales, there is no
allocation of routine profits to countries where functions and activities take place. This
means that formulary apportionment is undeniably a simpler approach, which should
reduce compliance and administrative costs. But it also risks what some might see as a
disproportionate allocation of revenue away from jurisdictions in which activities take
place.
Second, as discussed above, allocation by RGI rather than sales takes into account the
cost of goods sold in the market country; so the RGI approach apportions a smaller
share of total profit to market affiliates with a relatively high cost of goods sold.
Third, conventional formula apportionment allocates the overall profit of the whole
firm. The RPA-I on the other hand, as we have noted, is applied on a profit or product
line basis, providing a finer application of the underlying logic and limiting risk of dis-
tortions to the choice of product lines within the MNE. Of course, a pure formula ap-
portionment approach could also be undertaken on this basis.
Table 14 illustrates how a pure formulary apportionment system using only the loca-
tion of sales would apply in our base case example.76 The total global profit of 840
74 Mazerov (2001).
75 For an analysis of different proposals see: Morse (2010); Roin (2008).
76 Under the RPA-I, the allocation of total profit is amongst origin and destination countries, like the
traditional three-factor formula. However, the allocation under the RPA-I is based on a very different
calculation; there is no particular reason to expect the RPA-I to generate an outcome similar to the three-
factor formulary apportionment method.
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would be calculated and simply allocated to each affiliate and country according to
where sales are made.
Table 14. Formulary apportionment based on sales
Affiliate in:
TOTAL
A B C
Total profit allocated by sales 336 84 420 840
RPA-I allocation of total profit 311.4 125.6 403.0 840
Note that in our example, residual profit is much larger than routine profit. And since
the RPA-I approach allocates residual profit to market countries, the difference be-
tween this and pure formulary apportionment based on sales is relatively small. Nev-
ertheless, as would be expected, country B fares relatively badly under the formula
apportionment approach since it is primarily the country where manufacturing takes
place, rather than where sales are made.77
d. Minimum tax in destination country
There are also some similarities between the RPA-I and a recent proposal of Schreiber
and Fell (2017).78
All of the afore-mentioned proposals - those in the RPA family of proposals as well as
fully-fledged formulary apportionment - divide the total profit of an international firm
among the involved jurisdictions in an exclusive manner. That is, no element of a MNE’s
profit should arise in more than one jurisdiction, as long as the jurisdictions coordinate
to agree the same approach. The Schreiber and Fell proposal instead allocates the
overall profit associated with the relevant transactions of a MNE to both the origin and
market countries. Specifically, it has three elements. First, all jurisdictions would levy
an origin-type tax by application of conventional transfer pricing methods.79 Second,
each market country would tax a certain share of the overall profit of the enterprise
77 Aggregating through the economy, the difference in outcomes from basing the allocation on origin
and destination depends primarily on the balance of trade. Countries which are important origin coun-
tries are typically also important destination countries.
78 Fell (2017); Schreiber/Fell (2017); Schreiber (2018)
79 While the mechanism for calculating source country tax under Schreiber-Fell remains somewhat un-
clear, it appears to rely on traditional transfer pricing methods, looking to assets and functions, whereas
under RPA source country tax is specifically related to routine returns on purchase from third parties.
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(calculated either on a transactional basis following product lines as proposed here or
calculated on the basis of a group-wide profit split).80 Third, the market country would
give a tax credit for the conventional origin taxes paid elsewhere.81
This arrangement effectively makes the tax in the market country a minimum tax. In a
simple two country example, if the tax in the country of production is lower, the total
tax liability is equal to that in the market country; where tax in the country of produc-
tion is higher, there is an excess credit and no tax is paid in the market country. In this
way, the scheme reduces or eliminates any gain to the MNE from shifting profits from
the origin country to low-tax jurisdictions. As a result, it mitigates what under the RPA
might be an incentive to set low tax rates of routine profits to attract activities. At the
same time, however, it creates an incentive for origin countries to set tax rates suffi-
ciently high to soak up any potential liability in the market country.
A key difference between this proposal and the RPA family of proposals is the incentive
of market countries to introduce such a scheme. Under RPA proposals, market coun-
tries would be guaranteed revenue conditional on the existence of residual profit. But
under the Schreiber Fell scheme, they would raise revenue primarily only to the extent
that origin countries were unable to prevent profit shifting. It is not clear why a market
country would be prepared to provide a minimum tax back-up for an origin country,
except under a degree of international coordination.82
80 The two different approaches are laid out by Schreiber (2018) p.265 et seq.
81 Specifically, they propose that a credit is given for a share of conventional taxes, calculated as the
worldwide tax liability multiplied again by the share of sales in the market country.
82 This is acknowledged in Schreiber (2018) p.268 et seq.
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V. EVALUATING THE RPA-I
We now turn to an evaluation of the RPA-I. We do so under two settings. In the first
setting, which we discuss in more detail, we consider the case in which the RPA-I is
adopted universally, though with countries retaining the right to set different tax rates.
In the second setting we consider the case in which the RPA-I is adopted unilaterally
by one state. The latter is important for identifying whether individual countries would
find it in their own interest to adopt the RPA-I or whether it requires significant agree-
ment between countries; whether they would want to maintain it if other countries
were using it; and whether it would be subject to tax competition.
We evaluate the RPA-I against the five criteria set out in Chapter 2: economic effi-
ciency, robustness to avoidance, ease of administration, fairness and incentive com-
patibility.
Throughout this analysis, it should be noted, we assume that tax revenue remains with
the country in which liability arises. It would be possible, for example, to identify the
tax liabilities exactly as is done above, but for the market country to share the resulting
revenue with the countries in which functions and other activities were undertaken.
The effects of the tax on business – for example, on the location of its real activity and
tax planning – should not be affected by any such re-allocation of revenue between
countries. It might be argued, for example, that under the RPA-I the allocation of taxing
rights between the market countries and origin countries was too much in favour of
the market countries, and was therefore contrary to the interests of origin countries.
If this view were taken, then it would be possible to re-allocate tax revenues to coun-
teract this effect. Such revenue-sharing arrangement could then in principle ease adop-
tion of the tax. But, in practice, revenue sharing seems unlikely, and so we consider the
RPA-I in the absence of any such re-allocation.
1. UNIVERSAL ADOPTION
a. Economic efficiency
The tax base
As described above, the RPA-I is a tax on business profit as defined under most existing
corporate tax bases. It is not intended to radically reform the tax base – for example,
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constraining it to fall purely on economic rent, as under the destination-based cash
flow tax (DBCFT) in the next chapter. Instead it taxes the return to equity investment,
whilst giving relief for the cost of external debt finance. This choice of tax base is de-
signed to make it as close as possible to existing systems. But it is not a fundamental
feature. The key features of the RPA-I concern the international allocation of profit
between countries. It would be perfectly possible to use other tax bases – including
one based on economic rent, or using a different treatment of interest83 - whilst apply-
ing the same principles for the allocation of taxing rights across countries. That leaves
open the extent to which the tax base would need to be harmonised across countries
which implemented a common RPA-I system. We discuss that issue in Section VI on
Implementation below.
By design, then, the RPA-I fails to remove two forms of inefficiency that have been
described in Chapter 3.
First, because the return to equity investment is taxed, then there would be a distor-
tion to decisions as to the level of investment. That is – for a given required post-tax
rate of return on an investment – the tax would raise the required pre-tax rate of re-
turn. Investment projects which would have met the required threshold rate of return
in the absence of tax may not meet that threshold in the presence of tax. Note that as
long as the combination of both elements of the tax – on routine and on residual profit
– uses a conventional tax base, then together they typically (though not necessarily)
have the effect of raising the required return on investment and hence creating a dis-
incentive to investment. The total effect of the tax must therefore take both into con-
sideration.
Second, because the cost of external debt finance – interest payments to third parties
– remains deductible, the tax creates an incentive to use debt finance rather than eq-
uity finance. This is, of course, common under existing tax systems, and has been the
subject of much academic investigation, and different proposals have been made to
remove the incentive.84 We should here distinguish the general bias in the tax system
83 For example, the RPA could in principle have cash flow as a base, as in the DBCFT proposal in Chapter
7, or an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), as is now part of the European Commission’s CCCTB pro-
posal. Combining an ACE with interest deductibility in effect gives relief for the cost of finance and means
that the tax base is effectively only economic rent. Alternatively, it could also limit interest deductibility.
These options have been studied extensively elsewhere; here we focus on the international aspect of
the RPA-I.
84 For a policy analysis of the different proposals to reduce the debt bias see: de Mooij and Devereux
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in favour of debt finance, and the use of debt to shift profits to lower-tax jurisdictions.
Restricting relief to the cost of borrowing only from independent parties - and not for
within-company debt - is intended to address the profit shifting issue, but leaves open
the general bias in favour of debt.
However, to re-emphasise, the RPA-I deliberately mirrors as closely as possible existing
tax systems. Not surprisingly, then, some of the distortions that are observed under
existing systems would be maintained under the RPA-I. It would be perfectly possible
to modify the tax base of the RPA-I to avoid these distortions.
Location decisions
The impact of taxation on the location of economic activity has been the subject of
considerable research, which tends to show that the existing system has a very signifi-
cant impact on location decisions.85 This is a clear inefficiency, which has the effect of
raising overall social costs, as businesses choose locations for tax reasons rather than
for commercial reasons. One aim of the RPA-I is to limit the impact of taxation on loca-
tion choices of multinational companies.
In making a decision as to where to locate various functions – for example, production,
R&D, administration, financial, marketing – the most relevant part of the RPA-I system
is the tax on routine profit. Such location choices would not be generally affected by
the tax on the residual profit, since that arises in the market country. The tax ad-
vantages of moving functions and activities are therefore broadly limited to the taxa-
tion of routine returns. As a result, the incentive structure for locating real activities in
tax-favoured jurisdictions will be changed dramatically, because only the routine profit
on those activities will be subject to tax in those jurisdictions. In most circumstances
there are significant costs to moving functions to tax-favoured jurisdictions and to
maintaining them there as well. Those costs might be justified where substantial re-
sidual profits follow to that jurisdiction. But the comparison of costs and benefits is
very different when only routine profit follows.
(2009); Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2012); Centre for European Economic Research (2016);
Branzoli and Caiumi (2018); as to the legal background of the debt-equity distinction see Schön (2012)
and Schön et al. (2014).
85For surveys of this literature, see, for example, De Mooij and Ederveen (2008), Feld and Heckemeyer
(2011) and Voget (2016).
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A simple example can illustrate this point. For service activities, a routine return will
often be in the range of cost plus 6% to 12% of revenues, implying an operating margin
on costs from 5 to 10%.86 Moving activities with 100 of costs to a tax-favoured jurisdic-
tion to obtain a low tax rate on 12 of income is only attractive if the move does not
materially increase the relevant cost base. Suppose a business was considering moving
activities with costs of 100 from a country with a high tax rate of 35% to a country with
a low tax rate of 12.5%. The tax saving on income of 12 would be 2.7 (i.e. 22.5% of 12).
It follows that a 3% increase in costs because of the move would wipe out the tax sav-
ings.
As this example illustrates, if only routine returns are allocated to the jurisdiction
where functions and activities take place – as opposed to broadly the overall return as
in the existing system - then the incentive to shift functions and activities to tax-fa-
voured jurisdictions would be dramatically reduced. It should be acknowledged that
identifying a routine return is not an exact science; so that there may be opportunities
for the taxpayer to exaggerate the routine return if the relevant tax rate in the country
of the routine return is lower than that in the market country. Nevertheless, the addi-
tional incentives to shift activity to a particular location are not likely to be affected
greatly by such manipulation. Suppose, in the example above, the routine profit was
mistakenly identified at 15 instead of 12: this would raise the tax gain only to a little
under 3.4. Again, a 3% rise in costs would almost wipe out the tax gain.
As far as R&D activities are concerned, the RPA-I follows a straightforward approach:
the entities performing R&D will be assigned a routine profit along the lines of what an
outside contractor would earn. Any additional profit derived from the exploitation of
the IP right will be taxed in the destination countries. It would make no sense to shift
IP rights to tax havens and other low-tax regimes as these jurisdictions will not have
taxing rights anymore (unless they can show that functions performed on their terri-
tory deserve a routine profit or that the final product is sold there).
Of course, many current regimes have special treatment for R&D activity, including the
combination of patent box regimes and the nexus approach introduced by BEPS and
described in Chapter 3. Under existing systems, these can give a sizable incentive to
locate R&D in a country with a special regime. It seems reasonable to argue that such
regimes should lie outside the RPA-I system. That is, any explicit benefit provided by a
86 100 of costs marked up by 12%, for example, is equivalent to revenues of 112 less costs of 100 yielding
an operating margin of 12 or close to 10% of revenues.
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government for R&D (or any other activity that the government wishes to support)
should be independent of the working of the RPA-I, and hence have no impact on the
tax revenues collected by other countries. The key to achieving this is for transfer prices
and values to be independent of such an explicit benefit; ultimately the benefit would
then not affect the determination of residual profit (or routine profit) in other jurisdic-
tions. Of course, a lower tax rate on some forms of income, as is typically found in a
patent box, would also have no direct impact on the liabilities in other countries. The
same should apply to other provisions such as an R&D tax credit. An implication of this
is that governments may continue to seek to compete with each other over tax provi-
sions that are not fixed as part of the RPA-I.
Intermediate companies
One other location decision may be affected by the RPA-I - the location of a business
buying intermediate goods.87 A central motivation for considering taxing profit in the
market country is that individual consumers are relatively immobile; they are unlikely
to move their location to save tax on the profit of the business supplying them with a
good or service. But this does not necessarily apply in all cases to businesses.
Suppose an independent business - firm X - buys raw materials, capital goods and other
intermediate goods, and also services from a range of other profitable businesses.
These purchases can range from oil and commodities to machines, knowhow and IP,
and legal services. The businesses selling to firm X will have at least part of their resid-
ual profit in the country in which firm X makes the purchase. In extreme cases, if X
purchases the entire output of some business, then that business will have all of its
residual profit in that jurisdiction. In all of these cases, the aggregate tax bill of the
selling businesses would be lower under the RPA-I if X is located in a low-tax jurisdic-
tion. Note that X would also receive a routine profit on its activities in the low tax ju-
risdiction. If X merely purchases intermediate goods in the low tax jurisdiction, which
it then transfers to affiliates in other locations, it will only receive a (limited) routine
profit on its centralized purchasing activities.
87 Andrus and Oosterhuis (2017) p.99.
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To the extent that the tax levied on the profit of the businesses selling to X is passed
on to X through a higher price, then X may benefit from lower input prices if it locates
in a low tax jurisdiction.88 This may result in an economic inefficiency due to a distor-
tion to the location of firm X; if X would have lower costs elsewhere but its location
decision is affected by this factor, then there would be an economic inefficiency. Of
course, it is hard to measure the scale of this inefficiency. It does not arise under exist-
ing treatment, at least at international level, since taxes on profit are not generally
levied in the market country. Note also that it does not arise under the DBCFT, as ex-
plained in Chapter 7. There is no empirical evidence on the issue of which we are
aware. It is likely that the impact will depend on the nature of competition in the in-
dustries the output of which X purchases, and the extent to which the selling busi-
nesses adjust their sales prices between countries depending on the tax rate on resid-
ual profit.89
b. Robustness to Avoidance
When adopted in all countries, the RPA-I addresses well the three main channels used
by multinational companies to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions: lending from a low-
tax country to a high-tax country, locating intangible assets that earn a royalty or li-
cense payment in a low tax country, and manipulating transfer prices. Let us examine
each of these in turn.
First, the RPA-I would not give relief for the cost of interest payments on within-com-
pany debt. So a company that lends from an affiliate in a low tax jurisdiction to an
affiliate (or parent) in a high tax jurisdiction would simply not receive relief in the high
tax jurisdiction. Further, under the existing system, business is much more likely to
borrow from third parties in high tax jurisdictions, since that raises the value of tax
relief. Under the RPA-I, however, third party interest costs would be allocated – as dis-
cussed in section III.4.3. above - throughout the business, on the basis of income or
assets. Shifting, say, income to a high tax country would then increase the value of the
88 Note that the tax could affect the price, even if the tax base of residual profit is equal to economic
rent, because X can choose the location of purchase in order to affect the seller’s tax liability.
89 Mention should be made of the purchase of capital goods that are used in cross border transportation,
principally ships and airplanes. The taxation of the income from these goods is problematic today be-
cause much of the income is attributable to services performed outside the boundaries of any particular
country and the owner of the goods is often resident of a tax-favoured jurisdiction. These problems
would remain in identifying the location of routine and any residual profit.
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interest deduction; but it is also likely that it would increase the overall tax liability. The
capacity to use debt finance to shift profit between jurisdictions, would therefore be
eliminated.
Second, under the RPA-I it would no longer be the case that a large element of profit
could be deemed to be a return to intangible assets held in a low tax jurisdiction. Coun-
tries in which R&D is undertaken would earn a routine rate of return on their activities.
They would not share in any residual profit earned by the company; that would be
allocated to the market countries. Within-company royalty payments from an affiliate
using the IP to an affiliate that undertook the R&D would not affect the tax revenue in
either jurisdiction, being ignored for tax purposes.
Third, the key element of the existing transfer pricing regime that would be incorpo-
rated into the RPA-I would be the identification of routine profit. It is the value of rou-
tine profit that determines the tax base in the country where functions and activities
take place, and the deemed transfer price to other affiliates in the group.90 There is
therefore no need to try to identify a comparable price for a purchase from an affiliate
where that price is intended to reflect both routine and residual profit. Under the bot-
tom-up procedure described above, the transfer price will instead be based on the
costs incurred undertaking the activity plus the routine profit associated with that ac-
tivity. It is not based on the price sold to a third party. In this respect, the RPA-I diverges
from the pure Arm’s Length Principle. But it is this divergence that means that the RPA-
I is much less susceptible to profit shifting through the manipulation of transfer prices.
In sum, the RPA-I would create significant advantages over the current system in terms
of its robustness to avoidance. Many of the issues addressed in G20/OECD BEPS pro-
ject would no longer be relevant. However, no tax system is perfectly robust to avoid-
ance. We now turn to some areas where problems may remain, or would be intro-
duced.
Third-party distributors
One important issue for the RPA-I is the determination of the location of the sale to a
third-party customer. That is the location of the “market” for determining where the
90 In the case of remote sales by a business to a purchaser in another country the routine profit is simi-
larly used to calculate the business’s residual profit in market country – see Section III.3.1.
66
residual profit would be taxed. Suppose now that a business, B, aimed to sell to con-
sumers resident in country H, a high-tax country. Instead of selling directly to consum-
ers in H, the business might instead sell to an independent third party distributor, D,
located in a low-tax country L. The distributor, D, would in turn sell the product on to
the final consumers in H. In doing so, D would face the high tax rate of H on its residual
profit. But under this arrangement, D is likely to earn only a routine profit, and is there-
fore unlikely to pay very much tax in H, if any. By contrast, the original business, B, may
be highly profitable, but would be able to locate its residual profit in L, the low tax
country.
Note that this is similar to the inefficiency problem noted above, in that businesses
may choose to locate their purchases in low tax countries if that might reduce the price
that they have to pay to suppliers. However, here we may imagine that (at least in
respect of goods, among neighbouring countries) the costs of the distributor do not
vary between locations, so that there is no economic inefficiency. There remains
though the problem of avoidance: if the ultimate customers were resident in L, then
the arrangement with the independent distributor would not be necessary. This issue
is also related to the more general difference in the treatment of supply chains that
are all part of a single multinational compared to those that are not. If D and B were
part of the same group, then the residual profit would still be liable to tax in H. It is only
because they are not part of the same group that the avoidance opportunity arises.
The most obvious solution for this appears to be for the “market” country of residence
of the ultimate consumers, H, to look through the independent distributor, D, to tax a
share of the profits of the original producing business, B. This would involve a signifi-
cant additional extension to the taxing rights of the market country. The market coun-
try would be taxing the original producing business, B without it having a physical pres-
ence or even direct sales in said country. A question arises as to whether there would
be a genuine link between country H and B in this case, as required by customary in-
ternational law for the exercise of a taxing right. But the exercise of this right would
also not be straightforward in practice. To induce B to declare and pay tax on the re-
sidual profit, the tax authority in H could perhaps charge a withholding tax on sales
made by D, which would be creditable against any tax collected on the residual profit
of B. D may then be expected to pass the withholding tax on to B by offering a lower
price for the goods. B may then have an incentive instead to declare its residual profit
in H.
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Even if this was successful in practice though, there remains an issue of identifying any
contribution made by the distributor D. For example, D may change the nature of the
good in some way – anything from changing the packaging, to adding a brand name,
to more important modifications. Then the value of these changes would need to be
addressed. But the RPA-I approach would give a way of identifying the value attribut-
able to D. That is, the aim of the look-through approach would be to treat D and B as if
it were part of the same multinational group. In that case, D would be taxed on its
routine profit in the low tax country, L. Any residual profit arising from the activities of
D and B together would be liable to tax in H. How much of the residual profit is at-
tributed to each would depend on the original price paid by D to B. There would remain
an issue of defining the circumstances in which two businesses were to be deemed as
being in the same group. But such an approach might address the most egregious cases
of this type of avoidance.
Product v Product Line Composition
Another area in which business may be able to make choices that affect their tax liabil-
ities under the RPA-I is in the aggregating or disaggregating of products and product
lines. Whether to determine routine and residual profits separately for each product
or together for multiple products could materially alter the amount of tax allocable to
any particular jurisdiction. Giving taxpayers discretion over such grouping could there-
fore be problematic.
For example, suppose that one product is highly profitable and the product is sold in a
market in a high tax country. Another product is less profitable and is sold in a low-tax
country. Then combining these two products into one product line for tax purposes
may affect the allocation of residual profit in the two countries, depending on how
non-allocable costs are split between the two products if they are kept separate for tax
purposes.91 There is a trade-off here. If these two products are quite different from
each other, then it could be argued that the tax bases in each of the countries ought
not to be affected by combining the two products. On the other hand, if both products
are sold by the same multinational, then there could be some benefit in reducing com-
plexity and tax planning opportunities by combining the product lines.
91 As discussed in Section IV.1., this is a more serious issue when sales are used to apportion residual
profit.
68
While some tax planning is probably inevitable, the scope for such tax planning may be
limited in practice. The base for determining routine and residual profits should be the
underlying management financial statements that an MNE uses for non-tax purposes
and which have been audited by independent external experts. The design and mainte-
nance of these accounting systems involve business judgments by MNEs as to the level
of detail that is relevant for non-tax purposes. Of course, one would expect tax consid-
erations to have some impact on these management systems under an RPA-I. Tax au-
thorities can garner some protection by holding taxpayers to a requirement of con-
sistency over time in the level of aggregation or disaggregation of products, as well as
the basic requirement that expenses can only be set against sales in which there is
some connection, although that may depend on the capacity of the tax authority.
Remaining Disputes
Relative to the current system, the RPA-I should also significantly reduce the number
and magnitude of controversies over transfer pricing/income allocation issues. No
doubt many issues will remain: disputes over how to measure the appropriate routine
returns will continue as they do today; new disputes will arise over what transactions
are treated as local sale transactions; disputes will also arise over whether a particular
product is a component or intermediate product versus a final product, or whether
two products should be regarded as in the same product line.
The RPA-I would also introduce new scope for dispute in the case of remote selling,
where taxing rights would be allocated to the market country in a way that is not done
at present.
But overall it is difficult to see that the number and magnitude of these disputes will
come close to the levels under the existing system— in the case of transfer pricing
particularly after the emphasis in the new OECD guidelines on allocating income to the
jurisdiction where the management of risk occurs.
Moreover, once adopted, if disputes were problematic, there would be the option of
making the RPA-I system more mechanical. For example, it would be possible to move
further towards the route taken in the proposal by Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, by
specifying routine returns on the basis of fixed mark-up on costs and/or return on as-
sets employed rather than having those returns be based on third-party comparables.
But as noted above, the aim here is to examine how a system can be designed that is
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as close as possible to the existing transfer pricing system, yet avoid its most significant
problems, including eliminating the advantages of moving functions and activities to
tax-favoured jurisdictions. Any further refinements that are necessary to reduce the
level of disputes could be after its implementation.
c. Ease of Administration
We examine detailed issues of implementation in Section VI below. Here we simply
outline the main features that differentiate the RPA-I.
The RPA-I should reduce the administrative burden associated with applying and keep-
ing under constant review certain anti-avoidance rules. In particular, the RPA-I should
eliminate the most difficult transfer pricing issues, including those relating to the pric-
ing of intangibles.
It is the case that the RPA-I involves allocating profits between jurisdictions for remote
sales when this is not currently required. This will certainly add to the administrative
burden. However, the burden of collecting tax on routine profits does not appear to be
particularly high. As noted above, transfer pricing disputes may arise when setting rou-
tine returns; however, these ought to be relatively manageable. Furthermore, if this
exercise becomes too burdensome, one could move to more mechanical pricing sys-
tems, as noted above. This might be a particularly attractive option for low income
countries or countries with limited resources and/or expertise.
Taxing residual profits presents tougher administrative challenges. Recall that for a
country to measure residual profits under the bottom-up approach it must obtain in-
formation:
(i) to review transfer prices on purchases by local sales affiliates (or, in cases
where the MNE operates in a market country through a PE or if it sells re-
motely into a market country, information to construct deemed transfer
prices) including the allocable costs incurred in other jurisdictions and,
where relevant, the routine profit associated with those costs; this enables
it to identify the RGI of the local sales affiliate;
(ii) on the worldwide RGI of the MNE, for the apportionment of non-allocable
costs; and
70
(iii) on total non-allocable costs, and the associated routine profit, of the
MNE.92
Obtaining such information in a timely manner, reviewing and possibly challenging it
may involve considerable administrative effort. However, there have already been sig-
nificant moves in this direction in the form of the introduction of country-by-country
reporting, as set out in the G20/OECD BEPS Action 13 report.93
d. Fairness
In Chapter 2 we noted the problems which arise when seeking to evaluate taxes on
international business profit through the lens of fairness. And in Chapter 5 we dis-
cussed the grounds for taxing residual profit in the market country. Without repeating
that discussion in detail, it is worth distinguishing fairness between individuals, and
fairness between countries.
Let us start with individuals. With a conventional tax base, such as that used for RPA-
I, the incidence of the tax may fall on a number of groups of individuals: shareholders,
customers, employees and suppliers. In principle, which of these groups is worse off
because of the tax – and the extent to which they are worse off – depends on the
market conditions in which the business operates – for example, the product market
and the labour market. As these vary according to the circumstances, it is likely that
the incidence of the tax on business profit also varies. There have been many attempts
to estimate the extent to which the tax is passed on to employees, but despite efforts
over the last half century, there is still no definitive answer to this question – at least
partly because it is likely to differ between businesses.94 It is therefore extremely dif-
ficult to say whether a tax on business profit is likely to be progressive.
However, in evaluating a switch from a conventional tax to the RPA-I, the key charac-
teristic is that there is a change in where the tax is levied, even if there is no change in
the aggregate tax base - for example, wages would be still deductible, capital expendi-
ture still subject to depreciation provisions, and interest also still deductible. However,
92 Less information is required under a top down approach: worldwide residual profit, worldwide RGI
and domestic RGI.
93 Schreiber (2018) p.268 et seq.
94 For recent studies see: Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016); Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2018).
71
changing – in part – the location of the tax is likely to affect its incidence. Taxing on an
origin basis tends to drive mobile capital away from high tax countries, leaving immo-
bile factors in those countries to bear much of the incidence of the tax. Partially re-
placing a tax on an origin basis with a tax on a destination basis (through residual
profit) will diminish these effects. However, it is more likely to lead to part of the inci-
dence being borne by consumers in the market country. The RPA-I is therefore likely
to have a different incidence than a conventional origin-based tax; but these reflect
changes in the incidence between individuals located in different countries. It is diffi-
cult to say whether these effects are more or less fair compared to the existing system.
In comparing the position of tax authorities and governments, the RPA-I allocates tax-
ing rights over residual profit to market countries, which – in the absence of “pres-
ence” that meets current permanent establishment criteria have no taxing rights at
present.95 By contrast, existing systems allocate taxing rights to countries where pro-
duction and development activities take place, which under the RPA-I would tax rou-
tine profit realized there, but not – except to the extent that final sales also occur
there - the residual profit. However, to the extent that MNEs are currently able to
follow the “entrepreneurial model”, by declaring a routine profit in places where they
have real economic activities and costs, and a residual profit in tax-favoured jurisdic-
tions, then the disadvantage from the RPA-I to the former would be less pronounced.
Further, compared to pure destination-based options – such as a formulary apportion-
ment system based on the destination of sales, or the DBCFT described in the next
chapter - the RPA-I does offer some compensation in the form of taxing rights for rou-
tine profit related to product development activities and other activities. This may ar-
guably make the RPA-I more clearly aligned than pure destination systems with a tra-
ditional understanding of fairness in the international allocation of taxing rights be-
tween countries.96
Also, compared to these other options, the more traditional approach of the RPA-I
alleviates concerns about allocating profits from established jurisdictions to new mar-
ket jurisdictions. Under sales-based formulary apportionment, for example, the devel-
opment costs of products aimed at new markets would effectively be offset against
revenues from existing products in existing markets. Under the RPA-I the higher costs
and potentially lower unit revenues incurred in a new market country would be borne
95 Schön (2010) p.256 et seq..
96 Schreiber (2018) p.259 et seq.
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by that country rather than spread to all markets. The impact of new markets is dis-
cussed further in Section VI.5.d.
e. Incentive compatibility
We now consider the incentive compatibility of the RPA-I in the context of it being
universally adopted. Specifically, we address the question of whether, if all countries
maintained the RPA-I, there would be an incentive for countries to reduce their tax
rates, or to engage in other forms of tax competition that would undermine the tax
base?
These questions are difficult to answer since governments typically must consider two
factors that point in opposite directions. They typically would like to raise more reve-
nue from business taxation, or at least not to raise less revenue. That involves keeping
tax rates relatively high and attempting to combat tax planning that shifts profits else-
where to tax-favoured jurisdictions. Yet they would also like to make their jurisdictions
more attractive to MNEs that may locate their real activities there, and possibly also
their profits there. Under the existing system, countries have followed both strategies
- closing loopholes to make profit shifting more difficult, but also reducing tax rates
and relaxing the definition of taxable profit to make their countries more attractive to
inward investment. The RPA-I adds more complexity to these questions since there are
two levels of taxation, with countries potentially choosing to tax routine and residual
profits at distinct rates.
To begin with, the taxation of residual profit under the RPA-I is designed to be relatively
immobile, by allocating it to the market country. It is reasonable to suppose that indi-
vidual consumers are relatively immobile – businesses cannot generally choose to
“move” them to low tax countries. This suggests that countries can set their tax rates
on residual profits without concerning themselves too much with the rates set by other
countries. However, some caveats are in order. As noted above, where the customer
is a business, it may be more mobile. That may be the case for a bona-fide business
that seeks to reduce its cost by locating in a low-tax country, and thereby reducing the
taxes on residual profit of its suppliers. It may also be the case that businesses attempt
to use tax planning strategies such as sales through unrelated distributors which, un-
less countered successfully, would mean that they could benefit by making use of low
tax jurisdictions. This suggests that the location of real economic activity, as well as
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profit, could still depend on the taxation of the residual profit in the market country.
In turn and as a result, there would be some downward pressure on rates applied to
residual profit. However, it seems likely that such downward pressure would be much
weaker compared to the existing system.
The other element of the RPA-I is the taxation of routine profit where costs are borne.
As noted above, the benefits to multinationals of moving activities to countries with a
low tax rate on routine profit are limited, because the tax is based only on the routine
profit. This could suggest that the incentives for countries to compete for these activi-
ties would be weaker than under the existing system (although that depends on the
extent to which businesses already shift residual profit to tax-favoured jurisdictions).
On the other hand, countries which are interested in attracting economic activity
would have to compete even more aggressively through their tax rate to make it eco-
nomically attractive for businesses to move such activities.
While neither tax rate, on residual or routine profits, is likely to be as important to
location decisions – of real economic activity and of profit – as existing tax systems, it
seems likely that the tax rate on residual profit would matter less than the tax rate on
routine profit. This would suggest that countries may choose a higher rate for residual
profit than routine profit. In the extreme, if competition drove down tax rates on rou-
tine profits to zero, then the resulting tax system would purely be a tax on residual
profit on a destination basis.
Another element of the tax system which may be at least partially controlled by the tax
authorities or legislators is the determination of routine profit on a MNE’s functions
and activities. If this is set as envisaged, by reference to comparables, then tax author-
ities may have little impact on the routine profit. However, there are incentives for
governments, depending on the relative tax rates in countries of routine profit and
residual profit, to manipulate this routine profit. On the one hand, they would like to
recognise a high routine profit for activities taking place within their jurisdiction. That
is likely to raise overall tax revenue – at the expense of a lower residual profit being
recognised in the market jurisdiction. This is likely to be particularly attractive for low
income countries with a small tax capacity. Such countries are more likely to prefer to
specify a fixed mark-up, and a relatively high mark-up, 97 to ensure a reasonable
97 They may alternative choose a higher tax rate on routine profit, although this may be more salient to
businesses.
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collection of tax on routine profit.98 Further, if the tax rate on the routine profit is lower
than that on the residual profit, then tax authorities and businesses have an incentive
to collude to raise the routine profit; that would result in higher tax revenue on its
functions and activities, but a lower overall tax liability for the business. On the other
hand, reducing the routine profit in the place of economic activity, raises the residual
profit in the market country. If the tax rate on residual profit were low enough, then
that would reduce the overall tax liability of the business and make it more likely to
choose to locate its activity in the country which allocates low routine profits on func-
tions and activities.
Overall, given these conflicting objectives, and the fact that the location of responses
to changes in tax rates are likely to be smaller, it seems likely that there would be less
downward pressure on tax rates and tax bases under the RPA-I than under the existing
system - especially in relation to the taxation of residual profits.
2. UNILATERAL ADOPTION
We now consider the properties of the RPA-I if it were introduced in only one country,
or a subset of countries. It is important to analyse the properties of the tax in this
situation partly because it is perhaps more likely to be introduced in this way, rather
than by all countries agreeing to move to it simultaneously. But it is also important to
assess the incentives for governments to adopt the RPA-I on a unilateral basis, and to
either join or leave a group of countries that may already have adopted it. We are
therefore interested in the effects both on countries that adopt the RPA-I and on those
that do not. We do this by evaluating the RPA-I in these circumstances against the
same five criteria as used above: economic efficiency, robustness to avoidance, imple-
mentation, fairness and incentive compatibility.
a. Economic efficiency
For domestic activities within a country that adopts the RPA-I, the impact on invest-
ment and financial decisions will be broadly the same as if all countries had adopted it.
98 This is in line with the increased pressure by developing countries to introduce “safe harbours” for the
taxation of local activities of MNEs discussed in Section III.2.
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As discussed in the previous section, if the RPA-I keeps the same tax base as the existing
systems, then there will continue to be a negative impact on the incentive to invest,
and a bias towards the use of debt finance. However, the key issue to address here is
the impact of the RPA-I on the location of real economic activity.
To think through the implications of only one (or a group) of countries implementing
the RPA-I, consider 3 countries. Suppose that A introduces the RPA-I, while B and C
maintain their existing conventional systems. Suppose that the tax rates in the three
countries are the same, and also the same in each country for both routine and residual
profit; this allows us to focus on the differences in the tax base between the countries.
Suppose first that a business wants to produce and sell goods to consumers in C. It
expects to earn a high rate of profit, over and above a routine return. The consumers
are immobile, so that the sales must be made in C. But the business can choose to
produce in any country, and (if necessary) export directly to consumers in C. If the com-
pany produces in A, then it will face tax on the routine profit earned in A. There would
be no further tax in C (assuming that the business does not have a PE in C), since C does
not tax on a destination basis. Whether this creates a lower tax liability than if the
company produced in B depends on how it would organise its tax affairs if it produced
in B.
In the simplest case, the entire return would be taxed in B. If A and B have the same
tax rate, the company would therefore face a higher tax liability in B than in A, and so
would have a tax incentive to locate in the RPA-I country, A. It is possible, though, that
by using a variety of tax planning techniques, the company can divert its residual profit
from B to country H, a tax haven with no corporation tax. This would be consistent with
the “entrepreneurial model” described above. In this case, the company would face
the same tax in A and B – a tax solely on routine profit. This probably represents a lower
bound on the tax due in B. If so, and as long as the tax rates in A and B are equal, then
the tax liability from producing in A is unlikely to be higher than that arising from pro-
duction in B. Apart from the extreme case in which the company is able to shift its
entire residual profit to a tax haven, country A would become a more attractive loca-
tion for production by introducing the RPA-I. In general, therefore, and subject to dif-
ferences in tax rates, companies would have an incentive to move their real functions
and activities to countries that unilaterally adopt the RPA-I given that they will only be
taxed on their routine profits there.
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What about other scenarios? If the consumers were in B then the same argument
would apply. What if the consumers were in A? In this case, A would levy a tax on
residual profit earned on sales in A, as set out above. If A applied the RPA-I, then it
would define the residual profit as net of the routine profit earned in the country of
production. In this case, then there could be an element of double taxation.99 Suppose,
for example, that the company produced in B and did not plan its tax affairs to leave
its residual profit in H. Then it would face a tax on its entire profit in B, and also poten-
tially face a tax on its residual profit in A since the tax authorities in A and B would not
necessarily agree on the appropriate transfer price of within-company sales from B to
A. By contrast, if it produced in A, its aggregate tax base would be its total profit. At the
extreme, if the company – for tax purposes in B – shifted its residual profit to H, then
the double taxation would be avoided.
This then yields the same outcome in terms of incentives as if the consumers were in
C; A is generally a more favourable location for production unless the company could
shift its entire residual profit from B or C to a tax haven. There is one difference from
the previous case though. If production is in A and consumers are in C, then only rou-
tine profit is taxed, so the advantage to locating in A is because not all profit is taxed.
But if production is in B and consumers are in A, then the advantage to locating in A is
that residual profit may be taxed twice if production is in B.
To the extent that not all companies shift their residual profit to a tax haven (not least
because of the recent increase in anti-profit shifting measures), then the country in-
troducing the RPA-I would become a more attractive location to undertake production.
This is clearly because introducing the RPA-I would be like a move in a tax competition
game between countries.100 The RPA-I taxes only routine profit in the country of pro-
duction, instead of potentially taxing all profit. For a given set of tax rates, that makes
the country introducing the RPA-I a relatively tax-favoured location for production and
other economic activities.
Note that the tax on residual profit in the market country should not generally affect
location choices. As long as consumers are immobile, and as long as the tax does not
exceed any remaining profit, then there will always be an incentive for companies to
sell to consumers in a country with the RPA-I, even though they will be taxed on the
99 Under the Schreiber and Fell proposal, A would give a credit for taxes paid in B. However, this would
not generally be true under the RPA-I.
100 For a similar argument see Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst (2009), p.519 et seq.
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residual profit. However, this claim does not hold in one respect. Companies that pur-
chase capital goods, intermediate goods and component products from other compa-
nies may face an incentive to locate outside the RPA-I country. That is because compa-
nies selling into the RPA-I country would face the tax on their residual profit in that
country, which may be reflected in the price charged to the buyer. If a country unilat-
erally adopts the RPA-I, companies would therefore have an incentive to purchase such
goods in affiliates located in states which did not introduce the RPA-I. This would offset
the benefits of locating in the RPA-I country.
Note that although we have used the example of “production” in discussing the impli-
cations of the RPA-I, the discussion applies to all functions and activities, which would
be subject to tax under the existing system, including sales and marketing expenses,
R&D and G&A.
Broadly, in sum, introducing the RPA-I unilaterally would generally make that country
more attractive for location decisions. This is essentially because it is effectively a step
in the tax competition game, reducing the tax base in locations where economic activ-
ity takes place, and replacing them with a tax base (or a higher tax base) in the desti-
nation country. Yet in terms of worldwide economic efficiency, since unilateral adop-
tion would be more likely to affect MNE location decisions, it could result in higher
social costs. How far this happens depends on the extent, and speed, to which other
countries follow suit; we discuss that further in section e below.
b. Robustness to Avoidance
We have already discussed the robustness of the RPA-I if all countries adopted it. The
difficulties discussed above with respect to third party distributors, and other issues,
would continue to be important if a single country adopted it. However, two of the
main advantages relative to the existing system would have less force, and indeed may
make avoidance a more difficult problem for other countries.
Recall that the RPA-I ignores within-company flows of debt. A single country introduc-
ing the RPA-I would benefit from this advantage. However, other countries might be
disadvantaged. Suppose again that country A introduces the RPA-I, but that country B
does not. Then a MNE may lend from its affiliate in A to its affiliate in B. B may continue
to give tax relief for the interest paid to A. But if A does not tax the inflow of interest,
then it creates an incentive to undertake such a loan, to strip profit out of B. This
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potentially creates a disadvantage for B – and other non-adopters of the RPA-I. How
serious a problem this is depends on whether companies in B can already use these
techniques to shift their profit to existing tax havens, and whether B introduces effec-
tive limits to interest deductibility to combat such planning.
The same issue arises for intangible assets. Country A would tax the routine profit as-
sociated with the creation in A of an intangible asset. But it would not tax any income
flowing into A from other members of a multinational group as a license or royalty
payment for using the intangible asset. If that payment is deductible in the country
from which it is made, then again A is in effect operating as a tax haven for the purposes
of this type of income. And again, the importance of that depends on the opportunities
that MNEs already have to divert income in this way to tax havens or can introduce
effective limits to deductions for such payments.
The adoption of the RPA-I by a single country may therefore aggravate the problems
of base erosion and profit shifting in countries that did not implement the RPA-I. The
quantitative impact of additional profit shifting opportunities on other countries is
hard to gauge: MNEs already have many opportunities to shift profits to low rate ju-
risdictions. And the impact will depend on the particular circumstances, being greater,
for instance, if the adopter is a large and initially high-tax country. Non-adopters might
be likely to respond by strengthening anti-avoidance rules, such as thin capitalisation
rules, or by introducing withholding taxes.
c. Ease of Administration
We discuss implementation issues in detail below. Here we simply identify issues that
arise in the specific case of unilateral adoption.
Introducing the RPA-I unilaterally poses no specific problems for the taxation of routine
profit. But it may make the calculation of residual profit more difficult. If all countries
introduce the RPA-I, then the routine profit will be determined by the country in which
the economic activity takes place, where functions are located. Although there may be
an incentive for the tax authority in this country to collude in inflating the routine
profit, the fact that there should be a routine profit agreed, and hence a well-deter-
mined, (deemed) transfer value of a good or service provided to, or allocated to, the
market country, provides a basis for the market country to determine the appropriate
deduction in determining the residual profit.
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But suppose a company operates in country B, which did not introduce the RPA-I. The
company has significant costs of all forms in B and produces a good which it sells to
another affiliate in the market country A; A does introduce the RPA-I. To implement a
tax on residual profit, the tax authority in A would need information on the costs in-
curred in B, as well as the routine profit associated with those costs. This may be more
difficult if the tax authority in B does not split profit into its routine and residual com-
ponents.
In practice, it is possible that A may choose simply to recognise a deduction for the
profit declared in B, even if it is not restricted only to routine profit.101 If this is higher
than routine profit this would of course reduce the tax collected in A. But this would
also reduce the potential problem of double taxation noted above. But – as with the
case of remote sales - A may also be able to exercise leverage by proposing to levy tax
on gross revenues realized there with no allowance for routine profit taxed elsewhere,
unless the company produces credible evidence on its cost incurred elsewhere.
d. Fairness
Unilateral, as opposed to universal, adoption of the RPA-I does not add very significant
considerations with respect to fairness. Two that should be addressed are the possibil-
ity that worldwide profit may be taxed more or less than once in total, and that a coun-
try introducing the RPA-I may create a disadvantage to another country. Yet neither of
these is necessarily problematic.
As we argued in Chapter 2, the notion of single or double taxation is not very helpful.
Double taxation applies in existing systems where businesses must remit tax on their
profit and again on sales (through VAT or a sales tax, for example). In popular debate
these taxes may be thought to fall on different economic actors (shareholders and cus-
tomers respectively). However, the reality is more complex, and if it is often very dif-
ficult to determine who is actually worse off because of a tax.
In the cases described above, it is possible that one country seeks to tax the whole
profit of a company under the existing system, whilst another also seeks to tax the
residual profit. That may seem to introduce an element of unfairness overall, but is
101 Where the tax rates in the two countries are the same, this would be equivalent to the Schreiber and
Fell proposal which would give a credit for taxes paid in B.
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simply the result of two countries operating different tax systems. Imagine that the
market country gave no relief at all for the costs of the business arising outside its
country. This would turn the tax on residual profit into the treatment applied under an
excise tax, a sales tax, or VAT. If one of these taxes on the value of the sale is not
thought to be unfair, then it is hard to see why it becomes more unfair if relief is actu-
ally given for those costs incurred elsewhere.
The disadvantage that arises for non-adopting countries mirrors that which arises un-
der any form of tax competition. If – under the existing system or the RPA-I - country
A reduces its tax rate, then businesses have an incentive to shift activity to A from other
countries. And in addition under the RPA-I, businesses may find it easier to shift profit
into A from other countries, for example, by paying interest or royalties to an affiliate
in A. These issues arise whenever tax systems are not the same across countries.
e. Incentive Compatibility
We have already discussed the issue of incentive compatibility above in the sense of
whether a country has an incentive to reduce its tax rates when all countries have
adopted the RPA-I. We now ask whether a single country would want to implement
the RPA-I unilaterally, and what incentives adoption by one country would create for
non-adopters.
As discussed above, in terms of the location incentives created by the RPA-I, these are
generally favourable to the country implementing the RPA-I. Broadly, the RPA-I would
partially shift the tax base from being in the place of origin, to the market country. To
the extent that the customers of a business are immobile, then the overall tax base
would be less mobile. As noted above, this would probably lower the competitive pres-
sure to reduce the tax rate both for routine profit and residual profit. In the extreme
case in which businesses pay tax under the existing system only on routine profit, then
incentives under the RPA-I would be no different. But in all other cases, the incentives
would point towards adoption of the RPA-I. Introducing the RPA-I could therefore be
seen as a move in a tax competition game between countries to reduce the effective
tax rate on more mobile tax bases by reducing the tax base in the location of functions
and activities. Countries with a RPA-I would then also lose less revenue from reducing
the tax rate on routine profit, thereby encouraging still greater competition. But this
depends on the mobility of functions and activities . Countries which consider the
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corporate tax on profits from production activities to reflect to a large extent location-
specific rents – and which therefore would be reluctant to take part in tax competition
– would be less inclined to give up their claims on residual profits.
So, there would appear to be in many cases an advantage to moving to the RPA-I rather
than keeping the existing system. However, a more extreme move in the tax competi-
tion game would be to move completely to a destination basis and leave the origin
basis altogether. A country introducing the RPA-I might therefore be outflanked by
others introducing a pure destination-based tax, such as the DBCFT.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The RPA-I would allocate routine profits based on functions and activities and residual
profits to market jurisdictions. We have set out above the key elements and properties
of such a tax. But a number of practical issues must be resolved before it could be
feasible. The section below discusses the most important issues. Note that some diffi-
culties arising in the current system would remain – the distinction between debt and
equity finance, for example. We do not address these here, but instead focus on the
new issues that would be raised if the RPA-I were implemented.
We discuss practical issues under five main headings: the scope of the tax; the bound-
aries of the multinational; the tax base; identifying the place of destination and col-
lecting tax in that location; and legal issues arising from the possible need to overturn
existing treaties.
1. Scope
The problems of the scope of taxes on business profit are common to all tax systems,
and have been discussed in Chapter 5. From the perspective of economic efficiency, it
is desirable to tax all business income – both the return to capital and the return to
labour - in the same way, to avoid any distortions to the legal form of businesses and
to avoid to giving one form of business a competitive advantage over another. How-
ever, this may conflict with the administrative and compliance burden on small busi-
nesses and revenue authorities. In practice, in most countries – though not all - incor-
porated businesses are liable to a separate corporation tax, but the profits of unincor-
porated businesses are allocated to the business owners and are liable to personal
income tax. Of course, this is not universal. By contrast, VAT is normally applied to all
businesses over a certain turnover threshold.
The RPA-I is designed to address international issues in the allocation of profit be-
tween countries for taxation. It is not designed to address the problems arising from
the interaction of taxes on business profit and personal income taxes. Nevertheless,
the question arises as to whether it is feasible to apply the RPA-I to business income
that is subject to personal income tax, as well as to business income that is subject to
a separate corporation tax.
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In considering the taxation of residual profit in the market country, this distinction
should not apply. In principle, it would seem reasonable to apply the tax on residual
profit to all sales in a country, irrespective of the legal form or size of the business
selling in that market that would treat businesses selling in that country equally with
respect to their residual profit.102 It may be that for practical reasons, it would be pro-
hibitively expensive for the tax authority in B to collect revenue from a very small busi-
ness in A. That may suggest some threshold to be applied, which we discuss further
below.
To consider the tax on the routine profit, suppose that the RPA-I was introduced by
country A only for businesses that currently face a separate corporation tax. That
would imply that a business in country A that is not liable to corporation tax would
pay tax on its total profit in A, as under the current system. But if that business also
exported to B (which has an RPA-I that applies to all business), then it would face a
competitive disadvantage, since it would also be liable to tax in B on its residual profit.
That suggests that if the market country taxes the residual profit of all business selling
in that country, then the origin country should limit itself to taxing the routine profit
of all businesses.
Of course, this issue would not apply for businesses that were purely domestic – that
did not export or import any goods or services. The combination of the tax on routine
and residual profit would leave such businesses unaffected by the introduction of the
RPA-I, as long as the tax rates on routine and residual components were the same. It
would be simpler for such businesses to not have to distinguish between routine and
residual profit. For businesses with modest exports, there would be a trade-off be-
tween the competitive disadvantage and the greater complexity in identifying routine
and residual profit separately. It could be left for small businesses to elect in the origin
country whether they prefer to be taxed on their entire profit, or whether they would
prefer to be taxed only on their routine profit.
102 A related but separate issue has been discussed in section III.4.1 above. Businesses should be taxed
on their residual profit in a market country whether they sell their goods and services in that country
through a subsidiary, a branch or remotely. The RPA-I is neutral in the treatment of these different
options for cross-border sales.
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2. Boundaries of the multinational
Since the RPA-I contains one element of an apportionment system, for non-allocable
expenses, a question arises as to what businesses should be included in this allocation.
This is an issue that we discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of formulary allocation
systems. As we noted there, the idea of an allocation mechanism is that there is a
clear-cut division between independent businesses and integrated groups. But there
are many situations where the situation is less clear-cut, for example, when individual
subsidiaries have to comply with the interests of minority shareholders or when two
businesses engage in joint ventures.
In determining what constitutes part of the multinational business, it is necessary to
trade-off two competing objectives.103 On the one hand, it would be useful to have a
simple and clear definition, based on the parent’s ownership of, or voting rights in, an
affiliate business. This is the approach taken, for example, by the European Commis-
sion in its CCCTB proposal. On this approach, in order to be included the multinational
should own at least 50% of the affiliate, and have at least 75% of the voting rights.104
On the other hand, an affiliate that is 49% owned by the multinational would in many
cases be indistinguishable from one that is 50% owned. Arbitrary bright-line tests -
such as a 50% ownership rule – tend to encourage businesses to organise their affairs
to be just the more favourable side of the line for tax purposes. Depending on circum-
stances, a multinational may want to include, or not include, an affiliate in its overall
RPA-I assessment. This could distort business decisions, sometimes with real eco-
nomic consequences, and also create greater complexity.105
In practice, however, accounting treatment is typically based on the 50% ownership
rule. It is perhaps unlikely that a MNE would be willing to adjust its financial
103 Schön (2007) p.1073 et seq.
104 Art.5 CCCTB Draft Directive supra
105 In principle, it would be possible to include a proportion of an affiliate in the RPA-I allocation, rather
than have an all-or-nothing rule for inclusion. For example, the proportion included could be based on
ownership; if the multinational owned 49% of the affiliate, then 49% of its non-allocable expenses could
be apportioned with the multinational, and 49% of its RGI or sales would be included as part of the
allocation formula. But this approach would clearly contribute to greater complexity.
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statements significantly in order to manipulate the bright line for tax purposes. So
following a 50% ownership test seems a reasonable compromise.
3. Defining the tax base
Under a system of formulary apportionment, the principle is that total profit
should be determined and then allocated between jurisdictions. This raises the
question of the need for harmonisation of the tax base. If jurisdictions use different
definitions of the tax base, then there will not be an agreed measure of total profit.
Each jurisdiction may then base its own entitlement on its own measure of profit.
To prevent this, the European Commission plans first to harmonise the tax base –
the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) - before consolidation across member
states is introduced.106 US states do not have common definitions of the tax base,
but they are broadly similar, drawing from the federal tax base.107
As noted above, since there is an element of apportionment under the RPA-I, the
question arises as to whether the RPA-I requires a common base. The answer to
this question is that it seems probable that a reasonable outcome could normally
be achieved without the need for harmonising the tax base. Three elements of the
RPA-I should be considered.
First, current international transfer pricing under the OECD Guidelines or the U.S.
Regulations do not presuppose a common set of accounting rules in all involved
states. While such a common set might be helpful in order to avoid unintended
cases of double taxation or double non-taxation, there is no reason to believe that
the problems arising in the absence of a common set of rules would be greater
under the RPA-I than under the existing system. As a matter of substance, there is
a need to determine transfer prices for trade between affiliates of a single multi-
national group (and deemed transfer prices in the case of PEs or remote sales),
based on the expenditure of one of the affiliates plus the routine profit.
If there is no common tax base, then the definition of what is allowable expendi-
ture for the purposes of identifying the routine profit on functions and activities in
106 European Commission, Proposal for a Council directive on a common corporate tax base,
COM(2016) 685, 25 October 2016.
107 Hellerstein (2013).
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a jurisdiction could differ between the countries involved in a trade between two
affiliates. This requires the identification of those items of expenditure which con-
stitute the base for the calculation of routine profit , a task that can be fulfilled on
the basis of specific information from both financial accounts and tax accounts
without full harmonisation of the domestic tax base. One issue here is how to treat
special provisions, for example, incentives for R&D. As proposed above, the
straightforward approach is that such provisions should not affect the transfer
prices, but that the country offering the incentive should determine any adjust-
ment to the tax liability separately, leaving the tax base in other countries unaf-
fected.
Second, the RPA-I requires the allocation of non-allocable expenses to countries.
This is more akin to the formulary apportionment approach, ideally based on a
commonly agreed value of the expenses and associated routine profit. Again, with
different tax bases, these valuations could differ between countries. Again, how-
ever, the allocation could be achieved using financial accounts and tax accounts.
To the extent that a country wanted to be more or less generous in its treatment
of specific non-allocable expenses, then it could again make an adjustment, with-
out affecting the common book value used in the apportionment.
Third the apportionment of non-allocable costs should ideally be based on a com-
mon definition ofresidual gross income (RGI). Again, this factor could be calculated
by reference to book values. If countries were unwilling to do this in respect of RGI,
and their measures of RGI were significantly different, this might suggest using
sales revenue as a more straightforward measure, despite the disadvantages dis-
cussed elsewhere in this Chapter.
However, the bottom line is that – primarily by basing transfer prices and appor-
tionment factors on book values - the RPA-I could reasonably avoid the complica-
tions of agreeing a common tax base.
4. Collecting tax on a destination basis
A key element of the RPA-I is that residual profit is taxed in the market country, or the
country of destination. To make the RPA-I operational, it is necessary to define this
location more precisely. We have discussed the notion of destination in Chapter 5,
where we set out the notion of the customer location proxy, borrowed from VAT, and
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defined as “the location, residence, or place of business of the customer, the person
to whom the seller has a contractual legal obligation to supply the goods.”
Applying this approach to the sales of goods should be relatively straightforward. The
location of individual and even business consumers purchasing goods can be easily
identified where the sale is through an affiliate of the MNE; a MNE can reasonably be
assumed to know the location of all third-party sales made by its affiliates. Assuming
the MNE affiliate (whether a subsidiary or a PE) making the ultimate sale is in the juris-
diction of sale, that would be the entity taxed on any residual profit from the group’s
sales of products in that jurisdiction, plus on any routine profit it may derive from mar-
keting, distribution and any other activities in that country.
Other situations, however, raise more difficult issues that are specific to the RPA-I:
sales to unrelated business customers of intermediate and component products , sales
of final products through unrelated distributors, remote sales, and the treatment of
new market countries. We have discussed many of the problems – and potential solu-
tions - relating to these issues above; the discussion here is therefore relatively brief.
The location of sales of intermediate goods to unrelated parties raises difficult issues.
Such intermediate goods would include capital goods, and also goods incorporated in
other products typically either by transformation (e.g., chemical processing) or assem-
bly (e.g. installing semiconductors on a circuit board).
There are at least three places which might be considered as the location of the sale of
the intermediate good. First, it might perhaps be logical to trace through the interme-
diate good to a final good sold to a consumer. A second option would be simply to
identify the location of the sale as the place of residence of the business purchasing
the good. And a third option would be to identify the jurisdiction in which the pur-
chaser uses the products purchased.
The first might be more appropriate where the business purchasing the good did rela-
tively little to change the nature of the intermediate good itself, but simply sold it on,
for example as a wholesaler. However, the seller of the component or intermediate
product is unlikely to have an accurate accounting of the sale location of the final prod-
uct. Under the second, it would be relatively straightforward for the purchasing busi-
ness to locate an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction. The tax on the routine profit of the
purchasing company would then be kept to a minimum, as would the tax on the resid-
ual profit of the selling business. The third option would make this more difficult,
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although it could still mean allocating a significant amount of income to tax-favoured
jurisdictions in industries like electronics where much manufacturing has migrated to
such locations over the past 20 years.
Similar issues arise in sales to unrelated distributors, as discussed above. If sales loca-
tions could again be manipulated to allocate residual profits to tax-favoured jurisdic-
tions, then tracing the sale through to the final consumer would be more appropriate.
This would require the distributor to report the location of its resales to its multina-
tional seller. Such reporting may involve increased record keeping by some distributors
and wholesalers, but it is likely many multinationals already receive substantial data
on the location of these sales given their desire to keep a close watch on where and to
whom their goods are sold.
One issue here is that international law requires a nexus between the person taxed or
the activity being taxed and the country levying the tax. In effect the country of the
final consumer would aim to tax the profits of a business in one country selling to a
distributor in a third country.
As noted in Chapter 5, a business can also sell goods to consumers in a country without
a physical presence in that country by, for example, selling over the internet or through
catalogues. There is no reason why the consumer would have information on the re-
sidual profit of the selling business, which implies that that the tax authority must deal
with the selling business located abroad directly.
Governments also already have significant experience through VAT of taxing remote
sales in a destination country, even for digital products, and so VAT rules on taxing non-
resident businesses might be adapted for this purpose. It may be, for example, that a
withholding, or backup withholding, regime would be required of unrelated party dis-
tributors that bring goods into a country for ultimate sale to make sure that companies
are reporting their transactions properly. It may also be that a relatively high minimum
threshold of sales could be established to limit the burden to relatively large busi-
nesses.
Deeming a MNE to have a taxable presence in the market country goes significantly
beyond anything the OECD and most countries have been yet willing to adopt in con-
sidering when a business should be treated as having a permanent establishment sub-
ject to the taxing jurisdiction of the country of purchase. However, proposals from
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several countries for a tax on the profits of digital companies in the location of the user
face also go well beyond existing PE rules. In this context, a recent report by the UK
government stated that it did not “see collection [in such circumstances] as a signifi-
cant issue and noted that the more “important question is how to ensure that, for
those businesses with minimal of no UK presence, compliance with the tax does not
impose significant administrative burdens”.108
Another issue is what happens when a multinational business with potential residual
profits expands into new markets. Should the residual profits be taxable in that market
country from the date the business first generates such profits in that country? If the
business has no losses being carried forward, then the straightforward answer would
be to allocate the residual profit based on that year’s sales.
But if there are losses being brought forward from earlier periods, then it could be
argued that the current profits should be first allocated to those countries in which
those losses occurred. That is, jurisdictions with prior year losses should be given pri-
ority in allocation of residual profits, with the new market country tax able to tax re-
sidual profits only after that priority allocation is completed. Alternatively, an arbitrary
“buy-in” rule could be applied that phased in the full residual profit allocation to a new
market jurisdiction over, for example, a three or five-year period. The profits not allo-
cated during the transition would increase the residual profits of other jurisdictions
that are fully phased in.
Most income tax treaties (including the OECD model treaty) require that transfer pric-
ing between related parties be consistent with how independent enterprises price sim-
ilar transactions under similar circumstances. Moreover, most such treaties eliminate
origin-based taxation of intangible profits by the jurisdiction of “use” in favour of tax-
ation by the jurisdiction that finances and manages intangible development activities.
The RPA-I deviates materially from these provisions. For example, treaty country com-
panies that sell goods or services to a related party in a country adopting the RPA-I
could challenge the allocation of residual profits to that country and would be likely to
be successful.
Avoiding these challenges would require amending existing treaties. At a minimum
that would be a time-consuming exercise and, for countries that cannot override trea-
ties by legislation (e.g. France, the Netherlands or Switzerland), would make adopting
108 H.M. Treasury (2018).
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the RPA-I less feasible to the extent treaty partners were unwilling themselves to adopt
the proposal. Depending on the respective constitutional framework there are some
jurisdictions (like Germany, the U.S. and the U.K.) where legislation can in certain cir-
cumstances override treaties. Nevertheless adopting the RPA-I by legislation would not
make the concurrent breach of international treaty law go away.109
109 Sachdeva (2013).
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VII. CONCLUSION
This chapter has set out an alternative system, the RPA-I, for allocating international
business profits between jurisdictions. The basic approach follows OECD guidelines
and other proposals that have been made in distinguishing between routine and resid-
ual profit. The system allocates taxing rights over routine profits to countries where
MNEs’ functions and activities take place. It allocates taxing rights over residual profit
to market countries, where the MNE makes sale to independent, third-party custom-
ers.
The key aims of the RPA-I are to combat profit shifting, and to reduce economic distor-
tions to the behaviour of MNEs, although we evaluate the system according to all five
of the criteria set out in Chapter 2. However, another important aspect of the system
is that it is intended to be reasonably close to the existing system, to minimise the costs
of transition and to make it more accessible to those with knowledge of the existing
system.
Routine profit would be identified using existing transfer pricing techniques. But an
important element of the use of those techniques is that they would be used to iden-
tify, as closely as possible, only the routine element of profit. Comparables used to
determine routine profit should therefore be based on third party outsourcing busi-
nesses, in the form of contract manufacturers, researchers, logistic provides and mar-
keters; the returns of such comparable businesses should not reflect the overall risk of
the MNE’s business.
Transfer prices within the MNE would be based on this routine profit. In calculating
residual gross income (RGI) in a market jurisdiction the market affiliate would be
deemed to have purchased goods and services from other affiliates at third party cost
plus any associated routine profit. Residual profit allocated to that market affiliate
would be equal to RGI less a share of non-allocable costs including any associated rou-
tine profit, where the share is based on the proportion of the MNE’s total RGI earned
by that affiliate. The RPA-I system can therefore be thought of as a hybrid; routine
profit is based on existing transfer pricing techniques, whilst the allocation of residual
profit introduces some elements of formulary apportionment.
The fact that residual profit is allocated to the market country has benefits both in
terms of combating profit shifting and in reducing distortions in economic behaviour.
This is primarily due to the relative immobility of customers. Certainly when customers
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are individuals, they are unlikely to re-locate in order to reduce tax on their suppliers.
This may be less true where the customer is a business, and look-through rules may be
needed to identify cases where independent distributors locate in low-tax jurisdictions
as part of a tax planning scheme.
The immobility of customers in the market country, combined with the relative trans-
parency of transactions with third parties should make it difficult to shift residual profit
to other jurisdictions. The incentive to shift routine profit is also correspondingly lower
than the incentive to shift total profit. Basing tax on residual profit in the destination
country also significant reduces the incentive for MNEs to locate their real activity in
low tax jurisdictions, thereby reducing economic distortions.
One significant difference in implementation compared to the existing system is the
treatment of remote sales. Currently, if a MNE resident in country A sells directly to
customers in country B, without any physical presence in B, then its profit will be taxed
in A. By contrast, under the RPA-I routine profits will be taxed in A and residual profit
will be taxed in B. Taxation in the market country is not contingent on physical pres-
ence there under the RPA-I.
The guiding principle behind the RPA-I is immobility, but the proposal is tempered by
practical considerations. The RPA-I moves towards a destination basis of taxation but
stops short of full allocation to destination countries. It aims at departing from the ex-
isting system as little as possible because of the familiarity of existing concepts and the
costs and difficulties in transitioning to a completely new system. Nonetheless, by par-
tially, though coherently, moving to a destination basis of taxation, the RPA-I should
partly harness the substantial benefits arising from the relative immobility of consum-
ers, thus offering significant promise as a tax system that is fit for purpose for years to
come.
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Appendix A: The Algebra of the RPA
This appendix formalizes (with some simplifications) the account of the RPA, and of
the RGI-RPA variant in particular, set out in the text.110
Denote the costs incurred by the multinational in jurisdiction i by     . Assuming for
simplicity that a single mark-up   applies to all costs, routine profits in jurisdiction i
are thus
Π   =       (A. 1)
and (ignoring taxes) residual profits are then
Π   =   (     − (1 +   )     ) (A. 2)
 
where     denotes third party sales in i.
A top-down allocation mechanism allocates this residual profit across jurisdictions as
Π 
  =     Π   (A. 3)
for some set of weights     such that ∑      = 1.
For the purpose of a bottom-up allocation, costs     are divided into two types: (i)
costs that are can be allocated to sales in particular jurisdictions (in the numerical ex-
ample, these are costs of goods sold and local sales and marketing), with       denoting
costs incurred in i that are allocable to sales in j; (ii) below the line costs that cannot
be allocated to sales in any particular jurisdiction (costs of regional/global marketing,
G&A, and R&D ), denoted by     . Thus:
    = ∑        +     (A. 4)
Residual gross income (RGI) in jurisdiction i is then
    =     − (1 + μ)∑       .  (A. 5)
110 This analysis can be thought of as applying to the aggregate of the MNE’s activities or to a particular
product or product line.
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The top-down approach based on RGI simply sets     =     /  in equation (A.3), where
  = ∑      denotes aggregate RGI. Noting that
Π   =         − (1 +   )          
 
+         (A. 6)
 =   − (1 +   )   (A. 7)
use being made of ∑ ∑        = ∑ ∑          and denoting   = ∑      , the residual profit
allocated to i is in this case
Π 
  =     −          (1 +   )   . (A. 8)
The bottom-up approach instead simply apportions the non-allocable costs (1 +   )  
by RGI, that is by the proportion     /  , and deducts the apportioned amount from RGI.
That is clearly reflected in (A.8).
Alternatively, residual profit can be calculated as:
Π 
  =     − (1 +   )                     (  ) −   (1 +   )           −                                                       (  ) − (1 +   )              −                               (  ) (A. 9)
where the three terms correspond respectively to: (a) sales in i less all costs (inclusive
of associated routine profit) incurred in i (as in Table 2); less (b) notional transfers to
other entities in the group in relation to costs of good sold, this being the amount by
which costs with associated routine profit incurred in all jurisdictions attributable to
sales in i exceed allocable costs incurred in i (as In Table 3); less (c) the amount by
which I’s RGI-weighted share of unallocable costs exceeds unallocable costs incurred
in i (as in Table 5).
Using (A.4) to cancel terms in (A.9) shows that the bottom-up allocation in the latter
is exactly the same as the top-down allocation in (A.8).
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